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ABSTRACT
Constitutional War Powers of the United States: The Founding Prescription and
Historical Adherence

(Written by Blake Michael Annexstad under the direction of Dr. Miles Armaly)
When crafting the United States Constitution, America’s Founders carefully prescribed
an institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers between the legislative and
executive branches of the federal government. To examine the intentions of the
Founders regarding the Nation’s war powers as well as how American leadership has
adhered to this intent post-ratification, this study carefully analyzes the circumstances
which compelled this balance as well as its application throughout the history of the
American experiment. Following an examination of these circumstances and the history
of the United States, it is clear that American leadership, despite adhering to the
Founders’ intentions for nearly 160 years, has deviated tremendously from this
constitutional balance in the modern era. Beginning in 1942, this study demonstrates
that the balance of the Nation’s war powers began a dramatic shift away from its
founding intention in favor of a subservient Congress and an emboldened presidency.
Throughout the Cold War, this study finds that American presidents almost always
ignored the traditional constitutional role of Congress in authorizing hostilities by
unilaterally ordering military action across the globe. In doing so, modern presidents
have asserted the right to do so under an expansive interpretation of the president’s
Article II authorities or the auspice of authority from international organizations such as
the United Nations (U.N.) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As these
expansive assertions have gradually swelled the presidency’s powers over war for
nearly the past eighty years, Congress has largely enabled the expropriation of its war
powers through appeasement and a failure to mount any meaningful political or legal
challenge in response.
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Introduction
In the early hours of January 3rd, 2020, a United States military drone strike
targeted and killed Iranian major general Qassem Soleimani at the direction of President
Donald J. Trump near Baghdad International Airport in Iraq (Helsel et al.). In a following
statement, the U.S. Department of Defense announced the death of the infamous Iranian
leader, stating that the President had “taken decisive action to protect U.S. personnel
abroad” from an imminent threat and to deter future Iranian attack plans (Helsel et al.).
Hours later, the President himself echoed the defensive rationale for the order, claiming,
“We took action last night to stop a war. We did not take action to start a war.” (White
House).
In Washington, D.C., Republican and Democratic congressional leaders were
unified in labeling Soleimani as an enemy of the United States and a terrorist whose
death should not be mourned by any American (Santucci). While united in calling
Soleimani an enemy of the United States, many Democrats and some Republicans in
Congress criticized the President for acting unilaterally without the prior congressional
authorization (Carney). Days later, on January 7th, Iran retaliated against the U.S. for the
killing of its prized commander by launching more than a dozen ballistic missiles from
Iran at an Iraqi air base housing U.S. forces and materiel (Macias). Following Iran’s
retaliation, the House of Representatives issued a sharp rebuke of Trump’s use of the
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military by approving a measure directing the President “to terminate the use of United
States Armed Forces to engage in hostilities in or against Iran or any part of its
government or military” unless “Congress has declared war or enacted specific statutory
authorization for such use of the Armed Forces” (Segers and Congress H.Con.Res.83).
Being a concurrent resolution, the legislation only requires the approval of both chambers
of Congress and not that of the President to enter into effect. If the concurrent resolution
were to pass, some legal scholars believe such a resolution would not even have a legal
effect on the President’s powers over the military.
As United States-Iran relations continue to remain in a state of flux, the situation
in Congress illustrates an interesting constitutional question which has been the subject of
debate since the inception of the American experiment: When authoring the Constitution,
what did the Founding Fathers intend the legislative and executive branches to do in the
context of war, and how have these branches adhered to the Founders’ original intent
concerning war powers throughout American history?
Through this study, it is evident that the Founders crafted an evident institutional
balance of the Nation’s war powers between the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government in the Constitution. According to the Founders’ intentions, the
legislature was to control the initiation of hostilities through statutory authorization, while
the executive branch was limited to operational control of the Nation’s military forces in
pursuit of such authorizations—except cases of foreign attack against the United States
which necessitated swift and decisive action from the president. From ratification until
1942, American leadership—Congress and the president— largely adhered to the
2

institutional intent of the Founders regarding war powers. During this era, presidents
most always only ordered military action in pursuance of prior congressional
authorizations or in defense following foreign aggressions and attacks against the United
States. Beginning in 1942, this institutional balance prescribed by the Founders was
largely ignored by American leadership as the United States shifted from isolation to
neutrality. In modern practice post-1942, presidents often ignored the role of Congress in
authorizing the use of military force and unilaterally thrust American forces into action
abroad. While presidents have asserted expanded authority in the realms of war, Congress
has largely appeased the expropriation of its powers through a lack of meaningful legal or
political opposition to the practice. As such, modern presidents have wielded seemingly
unopposed authority in ordering military action, in spite of the Founders’ intentions and
the Constitution itself.
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Chapter I: The Founding Prescription
The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
—James Madison (1788.)
In order to answer how Congress and Presidents have adhered to the intentions of
the Founders throughout the history of the American experiment, this first chapter will
provide the framework necessary to examine the history of the war powers postratification in the following chapters. As such, this opening chapter is divided into five
sections that collectively tell the story of the Founders’ intentions.
The first section will detail the various clauses and provisions within the
Constitution itself. As with many constitutional ambiguities, it is necessary to include
many different clauses, not just those which are readily apparent to the war powers debate
but may have been used in the debate over American war powers throughout American
history (A. The Constitution).
Following an examination of the Constitution, the second section of this chapter
will then examine the circumstances and experiences of the British experience, noting
what conceptions of war the Founders cultivated from life with the king and parliament.
With this in mind, the section will also investigate the ideas of several prominent political
philosophers of the time: Blackstone, Montesquieu, and Locke, whose writings heavily
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influenced the Founders’ ideals when eventually structuring the American Constitution
(B. The British Experience and the Philosophical Roots of the Constitution).
The third section of this chapter will then examine the dawn of the American
experiment by investigating the experiences of the individual states under their respective
state constitutions following independence. Additionally, this section will also examine
the pitfalls of the original central government of the United States, which existed under
the Articles of Confederation. (C. The Experience of Individual States and the Central
Government under the Articles of Confederation).
Following an examination of the various circumstances under the Articles of
Confederation, the fourth section of this chapter will review the Constitutional
Convention of 1787, as the Founders met in Philadelphia to craft the Constitution itself.
While exact transcripts of the various debates regarding war powers and executive
authority are scarce, several members of the convention took extensive notes of many of
the proceedings. Through these notes, we are offered an additional lens into the Founders’
original intent when crafting the Nation’s distribution of war powers (D. The
Constitutional Convention of 1787)
Following an examination into the Constitution itself, the ideas and norms of the
philosophical and legal British traditions, the experience of the states and central
government under the Articles of Confederation, and the notes of the Constitutional
Convention, the fifth section examines the Federalist Papers. An examination into the
Federalist Papers affords a glimpse into the minds and rationale of three of the most
influential Constitutional framers and Founders— Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and
5

James Madison— when seeking to ratify the Constitution’s alternative government to that
of the Articles of Confederation (E. The Federalist Papers).

A. The Constitution
The Constitution categorically grants both the legislative and executive branches
powers associated with the use of the military and war-making. Aside from establishing
the legislative branch, Article I of the Constitution provides the scope of Congress’
constitutional powers concerning the use and control over the military. Central to the
debate regarding legislative authority are the provisions found within Section 8 of this
Article, which lists the enumerated powers of the legislature. Clause 11 of Section 8,
appropriately referred to as the War Powers Clause, grants Congress the power to
“declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures
on Land and Water” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 11). While the War Powers Clause lays the
foundation of legislative authority in the realm of the military and military actions,
Section 8 also introduces a plethora of additional clauses that have been used to reinforce
legislative authority, including:
• “To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 10)
• “To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than two Years.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 12)
• “To provide and maintain a Navy.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 13)
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• “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 14)
• “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
Insurrections and repel Invasions” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 15)
• “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.” (Article 1, §
8, Clause 16)
• Necessary and Proper Clause: “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.” (Article 1,§ 8, Clause 18)
Though not necessarily as apparent to the overall debate, the Constitution also explicitly
prohibits the states from engaging in war without the consent of Congress:
• Compact Clause: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless
actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” (Article 1,§
10, Clause 3)
Across the constitutional framework provided for the federal government, Article II
establishes the executive branch and intricacies pertaining to presidential powers over the
7

military. As Article I does with the legislature, the enumerated powers granted to the
president over the military are not limited to a single clause. Instead, the executive’s war
powers are fundamentally sourced from three constitutional provisions:
• The Vesting Clause: ”The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.” (Article 2,§ 1, Clause 1)
• The Commander in Chief Clause: “President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several states, when
called into the actual Service of the United States….” (Article 2,§ 2, Clause 1)
• The Take Care Clause: The President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed….” (Article 2,§ 3, Clause 5)
Also within Section 2, the Constitution enumerates the president’s power to make treaties
and appointments, by and with the consent of the Senate.
While the focus of this essay is to examine the distribution and scope of war
powers between the legislative and executive branches, it would not be an appropriate
assessment without also examining the judicial branch’s role within the debate. Within
Article III, the Constitution outlines the scope of judicial power, by extending such power
to “all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority….” (Article III,§
2, Clause 1). Under the authority granted within this aforementioned Clause, the judicial
branch has jurisdiction over the federal law of the United States, which includes dealing
with any legal issues which may arise in times of military conflict (Lawfare). Examples
of instances in which the courts have dealt with matters pertaining to war and military
8

conflict are plentiful throughout the history of the American experiment and shall be
highlighted within the following chapters of this assessment.

B. The British Experience and the Philosophical Roots of the Constitution
While the Founding Fathers would eventually reject British control, they would
not reject many of its legal traditions. Before the Revolutionary War and independence
from the British Empire, there was no such thing as an American identity. To this point,
the Founders still identified as British through their ancestral lineage, and thus held fast
to many of their customs and traditions. Many of the Founders were lawyers themselves,
educated in the practice of British common law and the British Constitution (Sevi 77).
During this period, it was not uncommon for a government to have a constitution not
codified within a single physical document as we think of with the U.S. Constitution.
Rather, the British Constitution was—and still is today— an unwritten constitution, built
upon a “host of diverse laws, practices and conventions that have evolved over a long
period of time” (Blackburn).
While the British Constitution may be an abstract sense of the modern
interpretation of the phrase, codified documents within it such as the Magna Carta (1215)
and the Bill of Rights (1689), detail political ideals and pitfalls which would eventually
shape much of the Founders’ desire for good government. The Magna Carta established
the Parliament of England, which would later become the Parliament of Great Britain in
1707, which ruled over the American colonies (Blackburn). Following the establishment
of the Parliament of England through the Magna Carta, the power of the British monarch
9

would forever be in a state of a gradual decline, as the legislature usurped many of the
Crown’s traditionally-held powers. Among these traditionally-held contested powers
were control over the British military forces and the power to conduct foreign affairs
(Blackburn). Traditionally, the British monarch held broad powers over foreign affairs,
including the power to unilaterally initiate hostilities (Blackburn).
Following the Glorious Revolution in 1689, the passage of the British Bill of
Rights finally tipped the balance of power towards the legislature (Blackburn) by limiting
the power of the monarch, securing parliamentary freedom of speech and parliamentary
elections, and establishing concrete rights of Parliament (Blackburn). By the eighteenth
century, any of the king’s long-term policy prerogatives which involved the use of the
military relied on parliamentary support for approval. In order to secure funding for the
use of the military, the king and his ministers would need to make their case before
Parliament, and thus be subjected to their scrutiny and debate. Even if the Parliament
sought to eliminate funding however, the British monarch could still initiate hostilities
and draw the people into war (Blackburn).
Aside from demonstrating a long power struggle between the British legislature
and the executive, the British Constitution also promotes includes a myriad of phrases
that would later be found within the American Constitution (Legal Information Institute).
For instance, “Commander in Chief,” “declare war,” “granting Letters of Marque and
Reprisal,” “raise and support Armies,” and “executive Power” all can be traced to their
roots within the British Constitution (Blackburn). These phrases, coupled together with
the historical pretext of British power struggles between the legislature and the executive
10

would be familiar to well-educated American colonists. Thus the Founders, many of
whom being well-versed in British legal tradition and law, would begin their
understanding of executive power and right as it is introduced through the British
Constitution.
While the Founders certainly understood executive powers as they were used
throughout the British experience, it is important to note that the Founders sought to
attain political knowledge and thought elsewhere. Rather than be singularly influenced by
British history, well-educated American colonists in the eighteenth century were heavily
influenced by the political thought of Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu. These three
philosophers wrote their own understandings of good government extensively,
particularly focusing on the balance of power between the branches and the intricacies of
executive power.
William Blackstone was one of England’s leading law scholars and politicians of
the eighteenth century, most famous for his Commentaries on the Laws of England
(William and Mary). He argued that the king had a royal “prerogative,” which allowed
him to unilaterally make treaties or appointments. Blackstone wrote that this power also
extended to declaring war, raising armies and navies, and issuing letters of marque and
reprisal (Sevi 78). Blackstone believed the king was to be properly considered
“generalissimo, or the first in military command, within the kingdom,” so that the king
would have the “sole power of raising and regulating fleets and armies” (Blackstone).
Realistically, however, the days of English generalissimo kings were long gone by the
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eighteenth century. As mentioned prior, the king could not freely wield the military
without the support of Parliament through their power over appropriations.
It is important to note that Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England
were used extensively by St. George Tucker, one of the most cited legal scholars in the
early United States (William and Mary). While Blackstone succeeded in discussing
various areas of common law, it failed to properly address the attitudes of American
society or to adequately address the new American government (William and Mary).
Tucker believed Blackstone to be too sympathetic towards the Crown versus that of the
legislature to accepted by Americans. In order to make Blackstone’s words more
palatable for early Americans, Tucker used Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of
England as a baseline for his own work, Blackstone’s Commentaries, which he began to
write as a more suitable alternative to the American reader in 1795 (William and Mary).
In 1803, Tucker published his work, now organized into five volumes, to better serve the
people of the young American nation through a better understanding of its legal system
and government. Until 1827, Tucker’s Commentaries served as the most-cited major
treatise on American law in the United States (William and Mary). Lawyers and judges
would frequently use Tucker’s works as a basis for their understanding of American law,
with the Supreme Court referencing it in forty early-American cases (William and Mary).
Even today, Tucker’s Commentaries continue to be referred to by modern lawyers, legal
scholars, and judges as a basis of the early American interpretation of British and
American law (William and Mary).
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Aside from Blackstone, John Locke was very influential in shaping the Founders’
understandings of the intricacies of government. For instance, Thomas Jefferson
borrowed several of his most famous philosophical thoughts from Locke when
composing the Declaration of Independence, which he modeled after the English
Declaration of Rights, as written following England’s Glorious Revolution
(Constitutional Rights Foundation). Locke’s influence is apparent through many of the
notions within the Declaration of Independence, such as through the incorporation of
“Life, Liberty, and pursuit of happiness,” an idea first contemplated by Locke in his Two
Treatises of Government, penned during the Glorious Revolution of 1689 (Constitutional
Rights Foundation).
Just as Blackstone, Locke believed that it was necessary to have a robust
executive prerogative, which he considered federative power (Tuckness). Locke’s
prerogative sought to enable the executive with the ability to freely wield the military
unilaterally to protect the interests of the nation. He believed that while the laws enabled
the executive to carry out the laws where it was clear and easily understood, chiefly
within internal affairs, the executive must have the power to maintain public good outside
of the confines of the law (Tuckness). Locke emphasized this point in his Two Treatises,
where he wrote:
Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for; and those
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in
his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require
…it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the
executive power… (Locke, Two Treatises, § 159)
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According to Locke, executive prerogative gave the executive the necessary power to act
in accordance with an executive’s own discretion, even if that action violated the law, in
order to more faithfully fulfill the laws which seek the preservation of the public life and
liberty (Tuckness).
While Locke advocated for a strong executive, he championed the idea that a
separation of powers was necessary to a legitimately functioning government that
operates according to the public good. Based on his experiences under British rule, Locke
believed that a strong legislative authority, representative of the people, was necessary to
counteract the selfish ambitions which may arise through a strong executive prerogative,
such as instances of unjust taxation or other attempts at impeding liberty (Tuckness).
While this legislative counterbalance was necessary in the eyes of Locke, he believed the
legislature was “usually too numerous, and too slow” in their decision making to best
protect the public good, versus the independent authority awarded through a strong
executive prerogative (Locke, Two Treatises, § 160).
Much like Locke’s conceptual “federative power,” Montesquieu also advocated
for a strong executive prerogative through his version, which he called “executive power”
(Tuckness). Like Locke, Montesquieu believed that the executive needed the power to act
outside of the law when the law falls short of protecting the public good. Montesquieu
builds on Locke’s conception, by expanding his prerogative to encompass greater
authority in war-making and foreign affairs, as he believed the establishment of public
security was not limited to an internal connotation (Tuckness). In defining the executive,
Montesquieu wrote, “by the executive power, the prince or magistrate makes peace or
14

war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides against
invasions” (Fordham). While Montesquieu believed the executive power should extend to
foreign affairs and war powers, he also believed that when too much power was held in
the hands of a single person, “there can be no liberty” (Fordham). As such, he conceived
a system of checks and balances built on the separation of powers between the branches,
which would later become the foundation of the U.S. Constitution (Constitutional Rights
Foundation). Montesquieu argued that while the executive would have considerable
powers in foreign affairs and war, the legislatures would be able to check such powers
through their control over appropriations. Montesquieu praised the British Parliament’s
ability to appropriate annual military funding, which allowed the Parliament to dissolve
the military, if necessary, to sustain liberty (Fordham). Once permitted by the legislative
body, however, Montesquieu argued that the executive should have complete control over
the army, stating:
…once an army is established, it ought not to depend immediately on the
legislative, but on the executive power, and this from the very nature of the thing;
its business consisting more in action than in deliberation. (Fordham)
While the Founders certainly understood executive powers as they were used
throughout the British experience, it is important to note that the Founders sought to
eliminate the tyrannical tendencies of the monarch, such as those exhibited during King
George III’s reign over the American colonies. With an understanding of these tendencies
through their hereditary ties to Britain, the Founders would eventually draw on the
commentaries of Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu to create a far more balanced
national government, complete with a strong executive.
15

C. The Experience of Individual States and the Federal Government under the Articles of
Confederation
Besides the knowledge gained through their British roots, the experiences of the
states under their individual constitutions and the Articles of Confederation proved
significant to the Founders’ understanding of good governance. This notion is reinforced
by historian Willi Paul Adams, who wrote:
The state constitutions’ profound influence on the drafting of the federal
Constitution and the ratification debates . . . took various shapes and forms,
ranging from explicit institutional precedent and reasoning by structural analogy
to negative examples of what to avoid . . . . [T]he state constitutions were a
natural point of reference in the constitutional debates of 1787–88 because they
were the constitutions Americans knew best. (Adams 290)
Following independence from the British Empire, the American states were ripe
with an anti-monarchical sentiment. Just as the Founders, the first state constitutions were
direct descendants from the British colonial system which preceded them, being
“modified to the extent necessary to bring them into harmony with the republican spirit of
the people” (Morey 19). Every state, whether through a preamble or a declaration of
rights to their constitution, prefaced in general terms that the democratic principles of
good government were partly learned through their experience and reason under previous
governments and rule (Morey 19). As demonstrated through the tensions between the
legislatures and executives in the states during this post-independence period, the
implementation of a weak executive proved unworkable. When crafting the Constitution,
the Founders used the experiences of the individual states to implement a strong
executive. As a necessary counterbalance to the implementation of a strong executive, the
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Founders would institute a system of checks to offset such authority. In the context of war
powers, an executive hampered by numerous legislative checks is inconsistent with future
claims of unilateral presidential assertions over the Nation’s war powers.
Just having fought a brutal war against what they considered a tyrannical
executive in King George III, the framers of the individual state constitutions sought to
endow the legislative branch with a vast majority of the power. From 1776 to 1787, seven
of the eight newly adopted state constitutions “included almost every conceivable
provision for reducing the executive to a position of complete subordination” (Sevi 80,
Chandler 441). Among these provisions, the executive would be subject to the destruction
of the executive prerogative in favor of a legislative executive council, entrusting the
legislature to elect the executive and control the state’s military forces state, and
extensive-term limits (Morey 28). For example, after being elected by the legislature,
Virginia’s governor would only be able to exercise executive power with the advice of the
state legislative council while being explicitly barred from exercising “any power or
prerogative by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England” under the state’s 1776
constitution (Morey 29).
While serving in the Virginia House of Delegates in 1784, James Madison
emphasized the pitfalls of such a system, remarking that the tyranny of Great Britain had
been replaced by the unchecked rule of Virginia’s tyrannic legislature (Sevi 81). Thomas
Jefferson, who served as Virginia’s second governor from 1779-1781, agreed with
Madison that Virginia’s legislative power had long outgrown appropriate bounds
(Monticello). In 1784 Jefferson, stated, “An elective despotism [in Virginia] was not the
17

government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles,
but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced” (Jefferson).
He complained that all governmental powers “result to the legislative body,” and that the
legislature's control of the executive was “habitual and familiar” to that of British rule
(Jefferson). Unfortunately, Madison and Jefferson’s mutual distaste for an overarching
legislative body was not limited to Virginia. Throughout the young American republic,
nearly every state also struggled with an appropriate balance of power between the
executive and the legislative branches, with the notable exception of New York and New
Jersey (Morey 28).
New York’s 1777 constitution was particularly favorable of the executive, as it
granted the state’s governor with expansive executive powers and independence from
legislative supremacy. This is demonstrated through George Clinton, who served as the
state’s Governor from 1777 through 1795 (Britannica). Clinton was “immensely popular”
among New Yorkers, who considered him to be a “forceful leader and able administrator”
of the state (Britannica). Unlike other executives in early state governments who were
elected by the legislature, Clinton was popularly elected and did not have to seek
approval from a legislative executive council (Morey 25). New York’s constitution
entrusted the governor “be general and commander-in-chief of all the militia, and admiral
of the navy of this State,” while enumerating no war or military powers to the legislature
(Yale).
While it was initially unpopular among the newly independent states, New York’s
constitutional model of executive power would eventually gain particular fervor among
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the other states as they grew tired of legislative mismanagement. In a letter to Governor
Clinton in 1779, John Jay commended New York’s strong executive and urged the
Governor to preserve its “vigor and reputation” so that it may serve as a model for the
other states (Sevi 83). In the Federalist 26, Alexander Hamilton proclaimed New York’s
constitution to be “justly celebrated, both in Europe and North America, as one of the
best forms of government established in this country” (Yale).
At the national level, Americans were just as frustrated with the structure of
government. Following independence from the British Empire, the thirteen colonies were
unified under the Articles of Confederation, the nation’s first constitution. Approved in
1781, the Articles created a national government which vested a majority of the power
within the individual states and a central unicameral legislative body (House). With no
executive branch, the unicameral Congress of the Confederation was at once the nation’s
sole legislative and executive authority (House). Under the Articles, Congress possessed
exclusive rights over the powers of war and foreign policy. Much to the dismay of
Alexander Hamilton and others, Congress frequently would conduct foreign policy by
committee, often leading to disastrous results with the European powers. Addressing
these drawbacks, Hamilton wrote:
Congress have kept the power too much into their own hands and have meddled
too much with details of every sort. Congress is properly a deliberative corps and
it forgets itself when it tries to play executive. It is impossible such a body,
numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision…
(Villegas 66-67)
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Additionally, Congress controlled the regulation, funding, and overall command of the
Continental Army, but lacked the authority to compel the individual states to aid in the
war effort (Britannica). With these omissions, Congress struggled to react to unforeseen
emergencies, which required the independent authority of a strong executive to protect
the public good. Such was the experience of Shay’s Rebellion (1786-1787), where an
armed group of disgruntled citizens sought to overthrow the Massachusetts government
through insurrection (Britannica). When Massachusetts Governor James Bowdoin
appealed to Congress for military assistance, Congress was unable to secure the
provisions necessary from the individual states— including Massachusetts— to quell the
rebellion (Britannica). As a result, Bowdoin was forced to turn to private donors, rather
than the federal government, to raise the necessary funds to protect its people (Yazawa
15). While Shay’s Rebellion would eventually be subdued through Bowdoin’s privately
raised military force, it demonstrated the pitfalls of a weak central government and the
executive branch, particularly in the matters of war.
While the initial reaction of the Founders and American statesmen following
independence was to cede executive power— particularly that of the powers of war, to
the legislative branch, the trials and tribulations sustained during the first decade of the
American experiment necessitated a strong executive with the ability to control military
operations. Many early-American politicians who favored legislative dominance came to
rue frail executives and overarching legislatures. As such, mitigating the power
imbalances present within the young American republic became an essential goal when
the Founders convened to frame a new Constitution.
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D. The Constitutional Convention of 1787
When the Founders met in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention in May
of 1787, the Founders quickly rejected models of government that mirrored the
legislative dominance of the Articles of Confederation (Center for the Study of the
American Constitution). While transcripts of the entire Convention do not exist, several
members took substantial notes on the proceedings (Yale). These notes, when coupled
with the first draft of the Constitution, give great insight into the Founders’ original desire
and understanding regarding the proper balance of powers between the executive and
legislative branches— including the powers of war.
After months of debate, the first draft of the Constitution was presented to the
Convention on August 6th, 1787 (Library of Congress). Referencing the successes of
empowered executives in states such as New York, the Convention’s Committee on
Detail designed an executive officer that wielded considerable military powers in the
areas of operational and procedural control. Using similar syntax to that of New York’s
Constitution, the initial draft of the Constitution vested “The Executive Power of the
United States in a single person… the President” (Library of Congress). Additionally, the
Committee’s draft also advanced that the President “shall be the commander in chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the Several States” (USAProject).
To negate fears that such powers over the military would lead to a tyrannical
executive similar to that of Great Britain, several provisions were included within the
initial draft, which enabled the legislature to counteract the executive in the areas of war
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appropriately. For instance, under Article VII of the initial draft, the Founders vested the
power “To make war, To raise armies, To build and equip fleets,” and “To call forth the
aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasions” to the Legislature (USA-Project). Furthermore, in
areas of foreign affairs, the draft also vested the power to make treaties and appoint
ambassadors to the Senate under Article IX (USA-Project). While being the preliminary
draft, the inclusions of these aforementioned clauses reinforce the early desires of the
Founders and the proper allotment of the Nation’s war powers in the final draft of the
Constitution to come.
Following the Committee on Detail’s initial draft of the Constitution, the
Convention scrupulously proceeded to debate each clause within the document, granting
further insight into the Founders’ original understanding regarding the powers of war. By
August 17th, the Convention centered on the clause enabling Congress to “make
war” (Yale). Just as other debates within the Convention, exact transcripts of the August
17th deliberations do not exist, and notes on the matter are sparse. Fortunately, however,
the notes of James Madison provide a key understanding of the Founders’ original
understanding of the balancing of war powers. According to Madison’s notes, Charles
Pickney of South Carolina opposed granting such power to the legislature as a whole, for
it was too numerous in size and thus incapable of moving with the necessary speed which
matters of war necessitated. Rather than the legislature as a whole, Pickney instead
advocated that the Senate would best be entrusted to control matters of making war, as
the Senate was more acquainted with foreign affairs and smaller in member size (Yale).
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Additionally, Pickney argued that since the Senate equally represented all states and that
all states had an equal stake in matters of the nation entering into war, the power would
best be vested in the Senate (Yale).
Pierce Butler of South Carolina also held reservations for Congress’ ability to
“make war,” albeit for different reasons (Yale). Butler, clearly favoring a stronger
executive prerogative, held that the president alone would be best entrusted with such
power, only to make war when “the Nation will support it” (Yale). Madison, on the other
hand, held that the clause’s syntax would grant Congress too many powers in the areas of
war. Joined with Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Madison urged the convention to
strike out “make” for “declare” war (Yale). In offering this amendment to the wording of
the clauses, Madison and Gerry make clear that the clause was solely intended to vest the
power of commencing formal hostilities with Congress. By striking the ability of
Congress to “make” war, Madison and Gerry also preserved the president’s ability to
“repel sudden attacks,” without the prior authorization of Congress as necessary to
defend the Nation. Additionally, the striking out of the phrase also ensured that once
Congress had declared war, it would be the president alone as commander in chief, who
would control the military operations. As such, while the power to declare war is vested
with the legislature, the power to make war—as understood by the Founders— is solely a
function of the president under his powers as commander in chief.
Following nearly five weeks of intense debate over the initial draft of the
Constitution, the Constitutional Convention voted in favor of the proposed document on
September 17th, 1787 (Library of Congress). Illustrating the Founders’ dominating
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sentiments garnered through their own experiences under British rule, the final
Constitution sought to prevent a single branch from unilaterally controlling the Nation’s
war powers. While some areas were designed to limit legislative influence, such as in the
process of electing the president, the Founders prescribed an institutional balance of the
Nation’s war powers between the legislative and executive branches. To the Founders, the
institutional powers prescribed under the Constitution would appropriately serve to
counteract one another, particularly in areas of war. While the Constitution granted the
president with a strong executive prerogative in times of war, particularly through
operational control of the military, the Constitution enabled Congress to appropriately
check such power under Article I. Under Article I, the legislative branch was vested the
power to declare war; the power to raise and support the military forces of the Nation
through appropriation; the power to make rules for the governing and regulation of the
Nation’s land and naval forces; the power to call forth the Militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions; and the ability to provide for the
organization, arming, and disciplining of the Militia, as well as the authority to train the
Militia, according to such discipline as prescribed by Congress (Cornell). Additionally,
the Constitution sought to prevent a tyrannical executive by limiting the term of the
president to four years (Article II, § 1, Clause 1), and through legislative powers over
impeachment. In cases of impeachment, the House of Representatives would be able to
“choose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment”
(Article I, § 2, Clause 5). If impeached by the House, the Senate, would then “have the
sole Power to try” the impeachment charges against the president, under the supervision
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of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who would preside over such a trial (Article I,
§ 3, Clauses 6-7). According to the Constitution, a president may only be found guilty
and thus removed from office “for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors” (Article II, § 4).

E. The Federalist Papers
Following the Constitutional Convention, the newly-proposed Constitution would
now be sent to the various states for ratification, a process that James Madison felt would
forever decide “the fate of republican government” throughout the world (Library of
Congress). While the proposed Constitution sought to eliminate the various pitfalls of the
Articles of Confederation, not everyone was ready for such a change. With memories of
British oppression fresh within their minds, opponents of the proposed Constitution,
chiefly known as the Anti-Federalists, feared that the document gave far too much power
to the executive branch. In order to dispel such fears and encourage a well-functioning
federal government, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay authored The
Federalist Papers. Throughout The Federalist Papers, various essays provide a direct
assessment of war powers under the Constitution, offering a unique view of several of the
most influential Founders.
In Federalist 8, Hamilton argues the Constitution is more likely to create a state
of peace, even without expressly prohibiting standing armies within its text. Many within
the young American Republic feared the possibility of standing armies due to their own
experiences under British rule and knowledge of European history. Without the unity
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provided by the Constitution’s ratification, Hamilton contends perpetual warfare could
run rampant among the individual states, much like that of Europe. Specifically,
Hamilton believes less-populous states would likely be threatened by the populous larger
states in such a situation, which would turn to drastic measures to maintain their defense:
They would, at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of
government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a progressive
direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war to increase the executive at
the expense of the legislative authority. (Yale)

In other words, without the provisions of the constitution, extreme defenses would likely
catalyze oppressive government practices. According to Hamilton’s explanation, war is
expressly an activity for the executive branch. He explains that the nature of war requires
the powers of government to largely be concentrated under the executive in times of war
in order to protect the Nation. He warns, however, that as executive power increases the
executive branch will continuously usurp powers from the legislature under the notion of
defense. Through an understanding of historical precedent, Hamilton argues that it is the
duty of the legislature to ensure that a war does not run in perpetuity, as the government
would be effectively run by a single executive in such in times of war. Such should be
avoided by the legislature in order to ensure that the will of the Nation is not discarded
for that of a single ruler. In war especially, a single executive—armed with additional
authority— would have a greater chance to oppress the liberties of the people through
unilateral and tyrannic actions.
In Federalist 24, Hamilton argues that a standing military force would be
necessary to defend the young Nation, even while not seemingly engaged in conflict. He
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necessitates that proper defense of the Nation requires a peacetime professional military
force to defend attacks from the established European powers adequately and to guard the
Western frontier. While, to some, this may be understood as the president having
unlimited powers over this standing force, Hamilton argues the opposite. According to
Hamilton, control over such forces lies with the legislature and, thus, the people, as the
legislative branch has the power to raise and support such forces as regarded fit.
Hamilton knew that such power was just as dangerous to liberty in the hands of many
versus a single executive. This is why, according to Hamilton, that Congress shall not
appropriate funding to support the military for a period longer than two years so that a
unitary executive is not enabled to subject the Nation to tyrannic practices that may arise
in war (Yale).
In Federalist 26, Hamilton yet again revisits the debate over standing armies. In
this case, Hamilton addresses fears that once in possession of such a standing force, the
executive would circumvent the legislature’s appropriation power by using “resources in
that very force sufficient to enable him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the
legislature” (Yale). Hamilton argues that such would not be the case, as any long-standing
force would only be the product of necessity through the legislature and therefore, the
people. The Constitution only allows the president to mobilize forces in the event of
insurrection or when it is necessary to defend the public interest. According to Hamilton,
such would rarely be the case, however, as the provided Constitution is designed to
promote unity among the Nation (Yale). In attempting to describe the appropriate
balances of power between the legislative and the executive branches concerning war, it
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is important to note that Hamilton never questions the executive branch’s role in
conducting the operations and tactical decisions of war. However, he does assert that such
operative power should not be exercised in the absence of legislative approval.
In Federalist 69, Hamilton explains the “real characters of the proposed
Executive” as devised through the Convention, to dispel fears that an empowered
executive would turn tyrannous under the proposed Constitution (Yale). To do so,
Hamilton frequently compares and contrasts the executive authority granted under New
York and Great Britain’s constitutional models, giving additional evidence that the
Founders considered the individual experiences of the states Constitutional Convention
deliberations. As explained in the prior section of this chapter, New York’s Governor was
among the strongest executives in the young United States. While Hamilton believed that
New York’s government should be “justly celebrated, both in Europe and North America,
as one of the best forms of government established in this country” (Federalist 26), he
understood that such executive authority continued to be perceived by many as a threat to
liberty. Hamilton takes careful consideration to negate such fears in Federalist 69,
specifically in the area of war powers, where the power of the president “would be
inferior to that of either the monarch or the governor” (Yale).
Further, in Federalist 69, Hamilton explains that the president’s authority as
commander in chief of the army and navy “would be nominally the same with that of the
king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it” (Yale). As for the substance of
the president’s war powers, Hamilton explains:
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It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the
military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while
that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and to the RAISING
and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by the Constitution under
consideration, would appertain to the legislature. (Yale)

Hamilton makes an important clarification on presidential war powers. Through the
Commander in Chief clause, the president wields king-like control over military
operations. Such is different from that of Great Britain, however, in that the president is
only able to exercise such powers following authorization from the legislature. While
these powers may appear similar to that of the king of Great Britain, they are indeed
different. First, although the president may make take operational advice from those
within his appointed Cabinet, the final decisions ultimately fall to the president as the
Commander in Chief. This contrasts with the king, who is free to make expansive
unilateral decisions on the military as a whole, including the raising and regulation of
fleets and armies, without regard to an executive council or legislative body. Additionally,
while the king may unilaterally declare war, the president would be prohibited from
doing so under the Constitution, as the president would be prohibited from unilaterally
declaring war and raising or regulating armed forces. Through equal representation in the
Senate, Hamilton emphasizes that a declaration of war would only be authorized when
the will of the nation as a whole, and not that of a single executive, supported it.
In Federalist 70, Hamilton reinforces the necessity for a unitary executive. To
Hamilton, a unitary executive best ensures governmental accountability, and
independence from legislative encroachments on executive power, and enables energy
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within the executive (Yale). Of these factors, Hamilton placed considerable attention
towards discussing the necessity for energy within the executive, writing:
Energy in the executive is the leading character in the definition of good
government. It is essential to the protection of the community against foreign
attacks…to the steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property…
to justice; [and] to the security of liberty…. (Yale)

Hamilton believes that through Federalist 70, the pitfalls of the plural executive scheme
will be readily apparent to his reader. According to Hamilton, a plural executive would
lead to internal quarreling among the branch between the various executive officers.
Unlike the deliberative nature which benefits the legislative branch, Hamilton asserts that
no “favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of dissension in the
executive department” (Yale). Hamilton believes such quarrels only serve to “embarrass
or weaken the execution of the plan or measure to which they relate,” therefor negating
the most necessary qualities of the executive—vigor, and expedition, without anything
positive in return (Yale). According to Hamilton, energy within the executive was most
necessary in instances of foreign attacks against the United States, where it served as the
ultimate “bulwark of the national security” (Yale). He contends that defensive military
action in response to attacks on the United States is the sole instance in which the
executive may order military action without congressional authorization. As illustrated in
the subsequent chapters, modern presidents have selectively interpreted Hamilton’s
argument regarding energy in the executive to be so important that it precedes that of
legislative authority over war powers. Modern presidential practice forgets, however, that

30

such swiftness is meant to be pursued solely in response to attacks against the United
States when the situation necessitates immediate defensive counteraction.
These aforementioned essays allow for greater clarity regarding the intentions of
the Founders when framing the constitutional government. To the Founders, complicating
the executive branch’s design through excessive checks and inherent weaknesses would
be a recipe ripe of idiocy. After a decade of legislative oppression under the Articles of
Confederation, the Founders well understood the necessity of an empowered executive
branch, who could operate decisively and independently to carry out the office. Many of
the executive powers— particularly those in regards to the operations of war, were best in
the hands of one rather than in many. Of course, such empowerment of the executive
branch would not be without appropriate checks. The Founders considered the power of
impeachment, frequent turnover of offices, and due dependence on the people for
reelection as appropriate checks to prevent the rise of a tyrannical executive like that of
King George III. Additionally, the executive was to be prohibited from commencing
hostilities like that of the British monarch. In accordance with the execution of the law,
the president would only be able to direct military operations following legislative
authorization to do so. Once a war or conflict was commenced, however, the Founders
sought it necessary to eliminate many of the possibilities in which a legislature could
interfere with the operational command of the military. The legislature could limit the
president’s war powers in other ways, however, through their power over appropriations
and over the raising of the military (except in cases of insurrection).
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Chapter II: The Founders’ Intentions at Work (1789-1942)
The constitution vests the power of declaring war in
Congress; therefore no offensive expedition of importance
can be undertaken until after they shall have deliberated
upon the subject and authorized such a measure.
—President George Washington (1793.)
As discussed in the previous chapter, it was understood by the Founders that war
should only be conducted when the will of the Nation as a whole supported it. This
understanding of good governance stood in stark contrast to that of the British monarch,
who held the unilateral power to declare war without regard from the legislature and thus
the people. In order to ensure that such unilateral decision-making would not be enabled
under the government of the United States, the power to declare war was vested to the
deliberative body directly accountable to the people— Congress. If the actions of
Congress regarding war were not popular with the Nation, the Founders knew that the
people could effectively make their voice heard through the electoral process and
eliminate unpopular and unjust wars. Supporting such intent, James Madison, who would
later enact the Nation’s first declaration of war as president, wrote to Thomas Jefferson in
1798, stating:
The constitution supposes, what the History of all governments demonstrates,
that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone
to it. It has, accordingly, with studied care, vested the question of war in the
Legislature. (James Madison, 1798.)
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Even as British-born leaders of the America’s founding generation were gradually
replaced by subsequent generations of native-born Americans, American leadership
largely adhered to the Founders’ intentions concerning war powers through the United
States’ introduction into the Second World War. Consequently, following the ratification
of the Constitution in 1789 until 1942, the institutional relationship designed by the
Founders concerning the balance of the Nation’s war powers largely remained
unchanged. While there are exceptions during this period, the vast majority of military
operations were carried out in adherence to the Founders’ intentions.

A. Congressional Declarations of War
From the days of the Washington Administration to the present, there have been
eleven separate formal declarations of war by Congress, collectively encompassing a total
of five separate wars— the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the SpanishAmerican War, World War I, and World War II.
As demonstrated through Table 1, which outlines each formal congressional
declaration of war throughout United States history, each declaration was enacted during
the period in which this chapter is scoped, with the first instance authorizing hostilities
against Great Britain in the War of 1812 (Senate). Throughout the nineteenth century,
each declaration of war was passed as a bill, while declarations of war during the
twentieth century were passed as joint resolutions by Congress (Elsea and Weed 1).
Even though the power to declare war is explicitly a legislative function per the
Constitution, Congress has never exercised the power on its own. Instead, each American
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Table 1: Congressional Declarations of War
War

Opponent(s)

Date of Declaration

President

War of 1812

Great Britain

June 18, 1812

James Madison

Mexican-American War

Mexico

May 12, 1846

James K. Polk

Spanish-American War

Spain

April 25, 1898

William McKinley

Germany

April 6, 1917

Austria-Hungary

December 7, 1917

Japan

December 8, 1941

Germany

December 11, 1941

Italy

December 11, 1941

Bulgaria

June 4, 1942

Hungary

June 4, 1942

Rumania

June 4, 1942

World War I

World War II

Woodrow Wilson

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Source(s): “Official Declarations of War by Congress.” United States Senate, United States Senate
Office, 10 Apr. 2019.

declaration of war has been preceded by a presidential appeal for Congress to act. By way
of either a written statement or a speech before a joint session of Congress, presidents
have appealed to Congress for action by outlining their specific rationale, which they
believed warranted a declaration of war (Elsea and Weed 1-2). Within these appeals,
presidents have cited the necessity for defensive action following direct armed attacks on
American citizens, territory, or the rights and interests of the United States as a sovereign
nation (Elsea and Weed 1). Following an appeal from the president to declare war, each
declaration was then passed by a majority vote within the House of Representatives and
the Senate before being sent back to the president for final approval and signage (Elsea
and Weed 1). The most recent declaration of war by the United States was against
Rumania (modern-day Romania) on June 5th, 1942, during World War II (Senate).
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Table 2: Date of Request, Passage, and Signage
Date of
Presidential
Request

Date of House
Passage and
Vote

Date of Senate
Passage and
Vote

Date of
Presidential
Signage

James Madison

June 1, 1812
(Great Britain)

June 4, 1812
(79-49)

June 17, 1812
(19-13)

June 18, 1812

MexicanAmerican War

James K. Polk

May 11, 1846

May 11, 1846
(174-14)

May 12, 1846
(40-2)

May 13, 1846

SpanishAmerican War

William
McKinley

April 25, 1898

April 25, 1898
(310-6)

April 25, 1898
(42-35)

April 25, 1898

World War I

Woodrow
Wilson

April 2, 1917
(Germany)

April 6, 1917
(373-50)

April 4, 1917
(82-6)

April 6, 1917

December 4,
1917 (AustriaHungary)

December 7,
1917
(365-1)

December 7,
1917
(74-0)

December 7,
1917

December 8,
1941
(Japan)

December 8,
1941
(388-1)

December 8,
1941
(82-0)

December 8,
1941

December 11,
1941
(Germany)

December 11,
1941
(393-0)

December 11,
1941
(88-0)

December 11,
1941

December 11,
1941 (Italy)

December 11,
1941
(399-0)

December 11,
1941
(90-0)

December 11,
1941

June 2, 1942
(Bulgaria)

June 3, 1942
(357-0)

June 4, 1942
(73-0)

June 5, 1942

June 2, 1942
(Hungary)

June 3, 1942
(360-0)

June 4, 1942
(73-0)

June 5, 1942

June 2, 1942
(Rumania)

June 3, 1942
(361-0)

June 4, 1942
(73-0)

June 5, 1942

War

President

War of 1812

World War II

Franklin D.
Roosevelt

Source(s): Elsea, Jennifer K., and Matthew C. Weed. “Declarations of War and Authorizations for the Use
of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.” Congressional Research Service, the
Library of Congress, 2014.

Table 2 details the respective timeline for each formal declaration of war
throughout United States history, from the president’s initial appeal to Congress to its
enactment. With the exception of President Woodrow Wilson’s request for a
congressional declaration of war against Germany in World War I, which was first passed
by the Senate, each declaration of war was first passed in the House of Representatives
before being approved by Senate (Elsea and Weed 4). In several instances, the process of
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formally declaring war has been accomplished in a single day following the request of the
president. For example, in the case of the declaration of war against Spain authorizing the
Spanish-American War, and the three separate declarations of war against Japan,
Germany, and Italy which authorized the involvement of American military forces in
World War II, Congress acted expediently on the request of the president by sending such
a declaration to his desk for approval within the same day. In the following pages of this
study, several of these formal declarations will be briefly examined to illustrate how they
comport with the Founders’ intentions regarding war powers.
Over two decades following the ratification of the Constitution, the constitutional
process for formally declaring war would be tested for the first time against Great Britain
in the War of 1812. On June 1st, 1812, President James Madison sent a message to
Congress outlining the hostile acts of Great Britain towards the United States (Elsea and
Weed 4). In his message, Madison chiefly denounced the British for their impressment of
American seamen, their violation of American waters, and their implementation of a
“sweeping system of illegal blockades” within his message to Congress (Hickey 40).
While Madison’s message is considered the first instance in which an American president
recommended a congressional declaration of war, Madison never actually explicitly
recommended such action, fearing accusations of executive influence in the legislative
duty to declare war (Hickey 41). The crux of his message to Congress, however, was
clear: “We behold . . . on the side of Great Britain… a state of war against the United
States; and on the side of the United States, a state of peace towards Britain” (Hickey 41).
While not explicitly calling for a declaration of war, Madison argued that to the British, a
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state of war already existed, and it was time for the Nation to defend itself against these
repeated aggressions. In response, the House of Representatives and the Senate voted to
declare against Great Britain (Yale). Perhaps due to Congress being comprised of the
founding generation being most familiar with the perils of war, the vote to formally
declare war against Great Britain in 1812 remains the closest such vote in United States
history. When the institutional balance concerning formal declarations of war was first
tested in 1812, the founding generation set an important precedent for declarations to
follow, by properly adhering to the constitutional prescription. While Madison could very
well have used force in response to British attacks on American commerce and argue that
it was in defense, he did not. By choosing to appeal to Congress before ordering military
force in 1812, Madison’s actions further solidify that the founding generation did not
believe that the president should wield such power unilaterally.
While each declaration of war adhered to the appropriate institutional prescription
of the Founders by being approved by Congress and enacted by the president, there are
certain anomalies pertaining to the preceding events which catalyzed certain declarations.
An example of such an instance is the events that led President James K. Polk to request a
congressional declaration of war with Mexico in 1846. Previously a territory of Mexico,
Texas won its independence in 1836 through an armed rebellion against the Mexican
government known as the Texas Revolution (Wallenfeldt). In 1845, Congress annexed
and subsequently granted Texas statehood, an act which inevitably placed the United
States and Mexico on a path towards war (Waxman). When Congress annexed Texas, it
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also inherited an unresolved border dispute concerning the rightful border between
Mexico and Texas (Waxman).
Rather than seeing the disputed area which comprised the territory between the
Nueces and the Rio Grande as a potential issue, President James K. Polk saw the territory
as an opportunity to further American territorial expansion (Waxman). Shortly after Texas
was admitted as a state, Polk deliberately worsened the border crisis by sending U.S.
Army units into the disputed territory to serve as bait for Mexican forces present in the
area (Waxman). In what is likely the greatest instance of a president aiming to unilaterally
start a formal war, Polk still acted with respect to the institutional balance of war powers
as prescribed within the Constitution. Polk knew that in the absence of a formal
declaration of war from Congress, he would not be authorized to take the actions
necessary to fulfill his ultimate goal of securing territorial expansion of the United States.
Knowing that he would need the approval of Congress to constitutionally conduct war as
commander in chief, Polk had already drafted a declaration of war to present to Congress
prior to sending U.S. forces into the region (Waxman). Polk knew that if American blood
was drawn by what appeared to be an act of Mexican aggression, public pressure would
force Congress to declare war against Mexico (Waxman). Soon after, when Mexican
forces attacked U.S. forces in the territory, Polk’s gamble paid off. On May 11th, 1846,
Polk gave his presidential appeal to Congress to declare war on Mexico, stating that
Mexico had “invaded our territory and shed the blood of our fellow-citizens on our own
soil” (Elsea and Weed 4, Fisher 1). Responding to a “glow of patriotic fervor” (Lindsey),
Congress authorized the declaration against Mexico, which was signed by Polk on May
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13th, 1846 (Elsea and Weed 4). While Congress declared war against Mexico, it did not
do so without reservations. On January 3rd, 1848, the House of Representatives passed an
amendment censuring Polk for “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally” beginning the
Mexican-American War (Fisher 5). In doing so, Congress asserted its authority, making
clear that they believed Polk’s use of troops without prior authorization was a violation of
the Constitution. The amendment passed by a vote of 85-81 (Fisher 5). Curiously, among
those who voted in favor of the measure, was then-freshman lawmaker Abraham Lincoln
(Fisher 5). While Polk’s provocative actions seemingly forced Congress towards
declaring war, the institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers were still properly
executed in the authorization of the Mexican-American War. It was Congress, after all,
which declared war with Mexico, and the president who executed such authorization by
controlling military operations as commander in chief.
The circumstances which preceded President McKinley's request to Congress for
a declaration against Spain also present abnormalities that are worth investigating. In the
months prior to McKinley’s appeal for authorization, an explosion on board the USS
Maine claimed the lives of 268 American servicemen in Havana Harbor, in the Spanish
colony of Cuba, on February 5th, 1898 (pbs). Over a month later, on March 28th, the
United States Naval Court of Inquiry ruled that the explosion was likely caused by a
submerged mine in the Harbor (pbs). While formal blame was never officially placed on
the Spanish for the explosion, public pressure for American military retaliation against
Spain in Cuba began to skyrocket following the ruling (pbs). In response to mounting
pressure for action, the U.S. presented an ultimatum to Spain, which demanded it
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withdraw its military forces from Cuba and recognize Cuban independence (Elsea and
Weed 2). The ultimatum, which was supported by a joint resolution of Congress,
authorized the President to use the Nation’s military forces to achieve these demands, if
necessary (Elsea and Weed 2). When presented, the ultimatum for Cuban independence
was swiftly rejected by the Spanish government. Only after Spain rejected the ultimatum
did McKinley, who already had congressional authorization to use the Nation’s military
forces against Spain, appeal to Congress for a declaration of war. In essence, the decision
to authorize the use of the Nation’s military forces in the Spanish-American War was
made to remove the Spanish from Cuba— in order to defend the interests of the United
States. Unlike other declarations, it was not enacted in retaliation for an evident attack on
American territory, sovereignty, military forces, or its citizens (Elsea and Weed 2). While
it stands alone in its reasoning for doing so, the declaration of war against Spain was still
made with respect to the constitutional process for doing so. While McKinley had the
authorization to use military force prior, he nonetheless sought a declaration of war from
Congress. McKinley’s actions reinforce the notion of the time, that in order for a
president to conduct meaningful war-making operations against another nation, he could
not do so in the absence of a formal declaration of war.
In stark contrast to the declaration of war with Spain, congressional formal
declarations of war during the twentieth century stemmed directly from evident attacks
against American territory, military forces, citizens, or sovereignty. While the United
States had worked to remain neutral throughout much of the First World War, Germany’s
decision to reengage in unrestricted submarine warfare against neutral American vessels
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(which it had previously agreed to halt) was viewed as an egregious attack on American
sovereignty and its citizens (Elsea and Weed 2). In his request to Congress on April 2nd,
1917, Wilson argued that the war had been “thrust upon the United States” through
Germany’s repeated assault on American lives and the Nation’s sovereign right to
neutrality (Elsea and Weed 2). Although Wilson signed the declaration of war against
Germany following its passage through Congress on April 6th, he negated to do the same
with Austria-Hungary, Germany’s most prominent ally in the war, until they became an
active threat against the United States (Elsea and Weed 2).
While each presidential request to Congress to declare war was grounded in
defense, perhaps none is more appropriate than the declaration which catapulted
American involvement into the Second World War. While the United States once again
aimed to remain neutral, it would again be thrust into war by defensive means. When the
Japanese military attacked Pearl Harbor and other American Pacific-based military
instillations on December 7th, 1941, it directly attacked American territory, military
forces, civilians, as well as the rights and interests of the United States as a sovereign
nation (Elsea and Weed 2-3). Consequently, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt
requested a congressional declaration against Japan the following day, Congress obliged
the request by swiftly passing the declaration through both chambers and returning it to
the Roosevelt for signage the same day (Senate). Except for the declaration of war
against Spain in 1898, never before had a formal United States declaration of war been
enacted with such expediency. Unlike the circumstances prior to the declaration of war
with Spain, which presumed war, the egregious Japanese attacks on December 7th, 1941
41

were an unprecedented surprise to the Nation and its leadership. Necessitated by the will
of the Nation, America’s leadership rose to the challenge as the Founders intended—
even in the case of extreme uncertainty. In the days to follow, when both Germany and
Italy each declared war against the United States, America’s leadership once again acted
swiftly to defend the Nation and fulfill its constitutional obligation. On December 11th,
1941, following a presidential request Congress passed two joint resolutions declaring a
state of war against Germany and Italy, which were also signed into force by President
Roosevelt that same day (Senate).

B. Congressional Informal Declarations of War
Aside from the instances in which the United States has formally declared war,
there have been many instances in which Congress has statutorily authorized the
President to use military force since the ratification of the Constitution. While these
congressional authorizations for the use of military force, also known as informal
declarations of war, are not explicitly included within the Constitution itself, the practice
was invented by the Founders themselves as they steered the Nation in the postratification era. Through an investigation into these early instances of informal
congressional authorizations to use military force, while not expressly mentioned within
the Constitution, it is clear that the Founders intended these authorizations to closelymirror the constitutional practice of formally declaring war. In most cases, like formal
declarations of war, congressional statutory authorizations for the president to use
military force have been preceded by a presidential request to Congress for action.
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Following an appeal from the president, congressional authorizations follow the exact
same process as formal declarations of war— they must be voted on and passed in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate, and then sent back to the president for his
ultimate approval. The chief distinction between a formal declaration of war and a
congressional authorization for the use of military force is how such power is delegated
to the president. When Congress has formally declared war, as demonstrated through a
majority of such declarations, the Nation is thereby thrust into a state of war with that
nation. Following a declaration of war, the president is then able to use the all available
military resources at his disposal as deemed necessary as commander in chief to execute
such a declaration. When Congress authorizes the presidential use of force via informal
declarations, the president may then use his commander in chief powers solely pursuant
to a specific scope defined by Congress. Throughout the nineteenth century through the
Second World War, American leadership largely adhered to the proper exercise of these
congressional authorizations by limiting the power of the president to exercise his
commander in chief powers solely in pursuit of the scope and provisions of the
authorization.
In what would later be known as the Quasi-War (1798-1800), an undeclared war
with France, President John Adams would be the first president to receive congressional
authorization for military action against a foreign state. Despite officially being neutral in
the European conflict between Great Britain and France in the decade following
ratification, American commercial vessels were frequently caught in the crossfire and
seized by French naval forces. In response to such a blatant disregard for the United
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States’ sovereign right of neutrality by the French government, President Adams appealed
to Congress on multiple occasions to enact legislation that would enable an appropriate
response. Specifically, Adams sought the authorization for the U.S. Navy to defend
against attacks on American citizens and commerce abroad (Elsea and Weed 5-6).
Heeding the call of President Adams, Congress subsequently passed legislation which
aimed to “more effectually to protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States” by
authorizing the President to instruct the American naval commanders to act against any
armed vessel attempting to commit such “depredations” on any vessel belonging to the
United States or its citizens (Elsea and Weed 6). In the event of the capture of a vessel
belonging to the United States or its citizens, the legislation also authorized the President
to direct American naval forces to retake such vessels by force, if necessary (Elsea and
Weed 6). President Adams signed this legislation into effect on May 28th, 1798. Months
later, Congress passed additional legislation that furthered the President’s authority and
specifically addressed the French attacks on American sovereignty and its citizens.
Signed into law by Adams on July 9th, 1798, this secondary legislation authorized the
President to instruct U.S. Naval forces and commanders to attack and capture any French
naval vessel found to be within the “jurisdictional limits of the United States, or
elsewhere, on the high seas” (Elsea and Weed 6). Further, the congressional authorization
of July 9th, 1798, enabled the President to grant the owners of privately-owned armed
American vessels to recapture any vessel, goods, and property belonging to the United
States and its citizens, while also granting them the authority to attack any French armed
vessel (Elsea and Weed 6). While these various authorizations which enabled the
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president to take action against France in the Quasi-War were unprecedented in American
history, President Adams chose to act solely in pursuit of the scope outlined by Congress.
By doing so, President Adams established valuable precedent concerning the exercise of
presidential war powers pursuant to an informal declaration.
The events of the Quasi-War led to several significant Supreme Court rulings
regarding the institutional balance of war powers. While they preceded Marbury v.
Madison (1803), which established judicial review, the Supreme Court rulings in Bas v.
Tingy (1800) and Talbot v. Seeman (1801) provide significant insight into the judicial
branch’s view that only Congress could authorize hostilities (Justia). According to the
rulings, Congress could authorize hostilities by a formal declaration of war, or as it had
done against France through legislation which permitted an undeclared war. These points
are underscored by Justice Samuel Chase, whose opinion in Bas read:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited
war, limited in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its
extent and operations are only restricted and regulated by the jus belli, forming a
part of the law of nations, but if a partial war is waged, its extent and operation
depend on our municipal laws.… [in the case against France] Congress has not
declared war in general terms, but Congress has authorized hostilities on the high
seas by certain persons in certain cases. (Justia)

Through Justice Chase’s opinion in Bas, it is evident that Congress has authority in warmaking, regardless of how that war originates. Chase agues that Congress may either
refuse to authorize the war or to write narrow laws to curtail the executive’s power in
response.
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Soon after the conflict with France, foreign attacks on U.S. commerce and
shipping would yet again prompt American Presidents to seek congressional approval for
the use of military force. Following attacks on U.S. vessels by Tripoli, Alexander
Hamilton, being a staunch advocate of executive power, argued that the president could
act without the consent of Congress in such an instance because Tripoli had already
declared war on the United States (Ramsey 5). Once war existed by means of another
party, Hamilton argued that the president, through his constitutional requirement towards
defense, had unilateral and unlimited authority towards the use of the Nation’s military
forces (Ramsey 5). Even following Hamilton’s arguments concerning executive power,
President Thomas Jefferson acknowledged that any military measure beyond those in the
line of defense would require congressional approval (Ramsey 5). In his appeal to
Congress in December of 1801, Jefferson argued that it would be prudent for Congress to
respond to Tripoli’s repeated attacks on U.S. vessels by authorizing the U.S. Navy to take
defensive and offensive responsive measures. On February 6th, 1802, Congress
authorized the President to direct all available naval forces and even privately-owned
armed vessels “for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the
Atlantic ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas” (Elsea and Weed 6). In 1815,
recognizing repeated Algerian acts of “overt and direct warfare against the citizens of the
United States,” President James Madison recommended that Congress declare the
“existence of a state of war between the United States and the Dey and Regency of
Algiers” (Elsea and Weed 7). In this instance, Madison was denied a declaration of war.
Instead, Congress passed an authorization for the President to use the Navy at his
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discretion in pursuance of the protection of American seaman and commerce “Atlantic
Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas” against Algeria (Elsea and Weed 7). While
the early nineteenth century authorizations against the North African states of Tripoli and
Algeria were against relatively minor adversaries and mainly pertained to naval
operations, they nonetheless demonstrate that no “material use” of the Nation’s military
forces were undertaken during the founding generation by the Founders themselves
without prior congressional approval (Ramsey 5).
Finally, Congress’ actions to suppress acts of piracy against American vessels
from 1819 to 1823 warrant investigation of the historical evaluation of war powers. In
this instance, congressional authorization directly responded to a growing number of
petitions from American shippers to Congress pleading for the protection of their
property and personnel from acts of piracy across Caribbean and Latin American waters
(Elsea and Weed 7). Congress authorized the President to direct the commanders of
public armed vessels of the United States to protect “the merchant vessels of the United
States and their crews from piratical aggressions and depredations” (Elsea and Weed 7).
The congressional authorization against piracy is significant as it illustrates an instance in
which the Founding generation authorized the president to use military force in the
absence of a prior presidential request to do so.

C. The Civil War
No historical evaluation of the Nation’s adherence to the Founders’ constitutional
prescription regarding powers of war would be complete without an examination of the
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American Civil War (1861-1865). Perhaps the most defining event in the history of the
United States, the American Civil War divided the Nation against itself, turned family
against family, and resulted in an unprecedented loss of American life. Prior to the
Vietnam War, the total number of American forces killed in the Civil War— over 624,000
Union and Confederate soldiers— exceeded that of every American war combined (Ohio
State University). Even through the present day, the American Civil War remains the
deadliest conflict in American history. Aside from the tremendous loss of American life,
the Civil War also impacted the historical exercise of the Nation’s war powers, albeit not
through a substantial change to the institutional balance of such powers as prescribed by
the Founders. Rather, the circumstances of the Civil War provided vital insight into the
commander in chief powers of the president in instances of insurrection.
While the Civil War was the deadliest conflict in American history, the American
Civil War was not a “war” in the constitutional sense, but rather an insurrection against
the United States government. Following the secession of numerous southern states to
form the Confederate States of America (CSA), the American Civil War officially began
following the Confederate bombardment of Union forces at Ft. Sumter, South Carolina,
on April 12th, 1861 (American Battlefield Trust). Following the attack on Ft. Sumter,
President Abraham Lincoln was not able to receive congressional authorization to wield
the Nation’s military forces, as Congress was not in session and thus unable to do so.
Nonetheless, President Lincoln was determined to uphold his presidential oath of
affirmation to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States,” as
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outlined in Article II, Section 1, Clause 8 of the Constitution, by ordering appropriate
counteractive measures (Cornell).
Because President Lincoln was operating under a case of insurrection rather than
war, his actions during the Civil War established crucial precedent regarding the
president’s wartime authorities. Lincoln, a man of deep principle and constitutional
understanding, aimed to fulfill this presidential oath of affirmation to defend the
Constitution and federal government by using all executive powers at his disposal, even
without prior authorization from Congress. On April 15th, 1861, President Lincoln issued
a public proclamation that an insurrection against the United States government existed
and called forth the various militia’s of the states to raise 75,000 troops in order to subdue
the rebellion (Senate). Lincoln’s proclamation also summoned Congress to convene in a
special session beginning on July 4th, 1861, “to consider, and determine, such measures
as, in their wisdom, the public safety, and interest, may seem to demand” (Senate).
Entrenched in his position that the Confederacy was in open rebellion against the United
States, Lincoln did not appeal to Congress to declare war. Lincoln believed that such a
declaration would be equivalent to recognizing the Confederate States as an independent
nation, which could subsequently rally international support to the Southern cause
(Center for Civic Education).
On April 19th, Lincoln ordered the enactment of a naval blockade of major
southern ports to cut off the Confederacy’s ability to receive supplies and materiel critical
to their war effort (Department of State). While Lincoln understood that his order had
important legal ramifications, as a nation would just close its ports rather than blockade
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them, he believed his actions were just (Center for Civic Education). In the months
following Lincoln’s order to establish an official blockade of southern ports, foreign
governments began to recognize the Confederacy as a belligerent in the Civil War
(Department of State).
On April 27th, 1861, following notice of a plot to destroy vital railroad tracks
between Annapolis and Philadelphia by a group of Maryland-based Confederate
sympathizers, Lincoln again tested his executive war power by unilaterally suspending
the writ of habeas corpus in Maryland— a state which had remained within the Union
(Dueholm). According to Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, known as the Suspension Clause,
“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” (Cornell). Nearly a
month later, Union troops arrested John Merryman in Cockeysville, Maryland, for
“recruiting, training, and leading a drill company for Confederate service” (Dueholm).
Immediately following his arrest, Merryman’s lawyer petitioned Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney, who was sitting as a federal circuit court judge, for a writ of
habeas corpus (Britannica). Following deliberations on the matter, Taney subsequently
issued a writ on the grounds that Merryman was illegally detained at Fort McHenry
(Britannca). Following Taney’s grant, General George Cadwalader, Fort McHenry’s
presiding officer, refused to obey the writ claiming that the President’s orders superseded
Taney’s (Britannica). Following Cadwalader’s refusal, Taney cited him for contempt of
court on May 28th, ruling that the President did not have the power to suspend the writ
(Dueholm). In what would be known as Ex Parte Merryman (1861), Chief Justice Taney
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issued an opinion days later stating that because the limitation on suspension appears
solely within Article I, which deals with legislative powers, only Congress had the ability
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (Dueholm). In spite of the Court’s ruling in
Merryman, Lincoln continued to oder the suspension.
In his address to the special session of Congress on July 4th, 1861, Lincoln sought
the endorsement of Congress for his unprecedented exercise of war powers, claiming that
none of his actions were “done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress” as
“no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist
force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation” (Center for Civic
Education). On the suspension of writ, Lincoln justified his actions on the basis that “we
have a case of rebellion, and the public safety does require” such a suspension per the
Constitution, which does not expressly specify who must exercise such power
(Dueholm). Even without prior approval for his exercise of war powers, following
Lincoln’s appeal, Congress subsequently passed legislation authorizing his presidential
use of war powers against the insurrection (Center for Civic Education).
In 1863, Lincoln’s actions would continue to expand executive power in cases of
insurrection, through Congress and the Supreme Court. Congress yet again authorized the
expansion of executive war power through its passing of the Habeas Corpus Suspension
Act. The Act officially authorized the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and
simultaneously released Lincoln and those who acted upon his order from any liability
for having done so without prior approval from Congress (Dueholm). Under the authority
granted to him by Congress, Lincoln yet again suspended the writ of habeas corpus six
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months later by expanding his order to the entire Union (Dueholm). That same year, the
Supreme Court ruled on the legality of Lincoln’s previous order to blockade southern
ports in the Prize Cases (1863). In the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the
President’s decision to impose a blockade was indeed constitutional (Justia). The majority
opinion of the Court in the Prize Cases concluded that for the conflict to be a war, it was
not unnecessary for the Confederacy to be acknowledged as an independent nation.
Additionally, while Congress had retroactively approved of Lincoln’s actions through
subsequent authorization, according to the Constitution, “…The President was bound to
meet it [the war] in the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to baptize it
with a name,” according to the majority (Justia). In siding with Lincoln’s expanse of
executive power, the Supreme Court cemented the executive power to act decisively and
expediently in times of war in the absence of prior congressional approval, regardless if
the opponent of the United States was recognized as an independent nation or sovereign
state (Oyez).
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Chapter III: The Imperial Presidency (1942-Present)
In my generation, this was not the first occasion when the strong
had attacked the weak… Communism was acting in Korea just as
Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and
twenty years earlier. I felt certain that if South Korea was
allowed to fall, communist leaders would be emboldened to
override nations closer to our own shores.
—President Harry Truman (1956.)
For nearly 160 years following the ratification of the Constitution, the Nation’s
leaders largely adhered to the institutional relationship of war powers devised by the
Founders. During this span, presidents would most always request authorization in a prior
appeal to Congress prior to using military force. In most cases, Congress would heed the
call of the president and subsequently grant military authorization through a formal
declaration of war or appropriate legislative statutes. Following World War II, the
institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers began to shift towards the presidency
dramatically. Though largely gained through unilateral action, the expanse of presidential
war powers throughout the last seven decades is also largely the product of Congress
abdicating its constitutional role in the process through inaction and appeasement. Since
the final declaration of war against Rumania in 1942, the use of the Nation’s military
forces has seldom followed the Founders’ prescription regarding the commencement of
hostilities through prior statutory authorization from Congress. Modern practice indicates
that the president most often commences military action by introducing U.S. military
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forces into hostilities rather than allowing Congress to exercise its constitutional role of
authorization. In seeking to justify the unilateral deployment of U.S. forces abroad,
presidents in the modern era have usually done so under the auspices of international
“authorization” via United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolutions or the support of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. It is worth noting, however, that while
presidents have argued legal authority from the U.N. or NATO agreements, such is
unconstitutional, or at least extra-constitutional, according to the Constitution’s
provisions on self-government (Fisher, Pres. Wars). According to the Constitution, the
Senate may not transfer the powers vested to Congress through Article I to any regional
or international organization via the treaty process (Fisher, Pres. Wars). In Medellin v.
Texas (2008), the Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of authority from the
Constitution or Congress, the president is unable to enforce international treaties (Oyez).
Presidential requests to Congress for the authority to use military force since
1942, when granted, usually have authorized broad military authority to use the Nation’s
military forces throughout entire regions, to defend U.S. interests in accordance with the
president’s own discretion. This contrasts with traditional congressional authorizations as
practiced by the Founders themselves, which granted the president narrow authority to
use the Nation’s military forces solely in pursuance of the scope of Congress. The
authority granted to the president through modern congressional authorizations closely
resembles that of formal declarations of war, where the president is granted enormous
latitude to conduct military operations across the globe according to his discretion.
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As presidents have gained such powers in the realm of war, clear trends
demonstrate the differences in how these powers were exercised. From 1942 to 2001, as
presidential war power increased, the Nation was repeatedly thrust into unconstitutional
military conflicts to defend United States interests and foreign states against the spread of
communism and anti-American ideals. In doing so, presidents have tried to hide the true
nature of their actions to Congress and the American people. Following the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, 2001, twenty-first century presidents have largely ignored
Congress and instead acted unilaterally to introduce U.S. forces into various conflicts
across the globe. In both periods of the expansion of presidential war powers, presidents
have either claimed authorization to do so on the basis of executive constitutional
authority, prior broad congressional authorizations, United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, or in support of NATO allies.

A. 1942-2001
Since 1942, presidents have sought to expand the war powers of the presidency at
the expense of the Founders’ intentions. The inauguration of the present presidential
campaign to increase the office’s war powers follows the Nation’s final formal
declaration of war against Rumania in mid-1942.
As President Franklin D. Roosevelt was the last president to receive a declaration
of war from Congress, his actions did not result in the expanded presidential power over
the initiation of hostilities. Rather, as demonstrated through the Supreme Court’s rulings
in Ex Parte Quirin (1942) and Korematsu v. United States (1944), Roosevelt expanded
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presidential war powers through his unprecedented execution of such congressional
authorizations. In Quirin, despite Congress’ role in determining who gets access to what
courts per the Constitution, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld Roosevelt’s order to
establish a trial by military commission for eight German conspirators captured following
a failed attempt to sabotage various targets within the United States (Justia). The Court
ruled the as the German conspirators were captured as spies without uniform with the
intent to sabotage, they had violated the laws of war and thus were unlawful enemy
combatants (Justia). As Congress had authorized such military commissions to try
unlawful enemy combatants through the Articles of War, the Court ruled that the
president had the power to order such commissions through the execution of these
Articles as commander in chief (Justia). Following the Supreme Court’s cementing of
executive power in Quirin, the proper limit of presidential authority following a
declaration of war was increasingly unclear. Two years later, the Supreme Court set the
limits of presidential authority through its decision in Korematsu. Following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 on February
19th, 1942 (George Mason University). Citing the authority vested in him as President of
the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, Roosevelt’s order
authorized the exclusion of Americans from certain areas of the United States as deemed
appropriate by the War Department (Oyez). Soon after, the Army’s Western Defense
Command, charged with overseeing the defense of the West Coast of the United States,
used Roosevelt’s order to force the relocation of tens of thousands of Americans, chiefly
those of Japanese descent, to internment camps (George Mason University). In
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Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld Roosevelt’s controversial Order in a 6-3 decision
and confirmed the executive authority to relocate American citizens in a state of war
(Oyez). Through Quirin and Korematsu, the Supreme Court affirmed Roosevelt’s broad
execution of executive authority during wartime, which consequently enabled successive
expansion of presidential war powers throughout the twentieth century.
While Roosevelt set the stage for the expansion of presidential war powers, it
would ultimately be his successor, Harry Truman, who would catalyze it. Upon
Roosevelt’s death in office in 1945, then-Vice President Truman was handed the reigns to
an emboldened presidency. In the months to follow, President Truman led United States
military forces to victory in Europe and ultimately forced a defiant Imperial Japan into
submission through the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The resulting
power vacuum which followed the collapse of Nazi Germany in Europe and Imperial
Japan in Asia, ushered in a new enemy for the United States— the Soviet Union and
communism. Newly strengthened both militarily and politically, the Soviet Union and the
United States saw the economic and political policies of one another as a threat to their
own interests. By 1946, as communism began to spread throughout Europe and Asia
rapidly, President Truman believed that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable and
began to formulate policies for the containment of the “communist threat” (Nelson 120).
The next year, Truman ushered in a new American foreign policy of containing the
geopolitical spread of communism and the Soviet threat in what would later be known as
the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine pledged that the United States would provide
“political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from
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external or internal authoritarian forces,” and thus ushered in the Cold War with the
Soviet Union (Department of State). Truman’s pledge marked a stark departure from the
American norm of neutrality and isolation from foreign conflicts not directly affecting the
United States, to one of interventionism in the world’s affairs (Department of State).
In 1950, Truman implemented his policy of American military interventionism by
unilaterally taking the Nation to war against North Korea in the Korean War (1950-1953).
Following the invasion of South Korea by North Korean communist forces, Truman
abandoned the presidential practice of seeking statutory authorization from Congress
established by the Founders prior to taking military action. On June 26th, 1950, Truman
announced that the United Nations Security Council had ordered North Korea to
withdraw its military forces from South Korea. The next day, stating that North Korea
had failed to comply with the withdrawal order, Truman announced that he had ordered
U.S. naval and air forces to provide South Korea with support (Fisher, Pres. Wars). In his
June 27th announcement, Truman implied that the Soviet Union was behind the North
Korean invasion and that his behavior was commensurate under the authority granted to
him by the United Nations (Nelson 123). In actuality, however, Truman’s actions were in
direct violation of the U.N. Participation Act, which he signed into law with no
objections in December of 1945 (Fisher, Pres. Wars). According to the Act, any U.N.
agreements for the use of military force “shall be subject to the approval of the Congress
by appropriate Act or joint resolution” (Fisher, Pres. Wars).
Not only did Truman progress presidential war powers regarding the initiation of
hostilities, he deliberately went to great lengths to deceive Congress and the American
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public as to the true nature of his actions. When asked if the Nation was at war during a
press conference on June 29th, 1950, Truman remarked “We are not at war,” but equated
the use of U.S. forces to “a police action under the United Nations” (Fisher, Libya and
War 2). In a Senate hearing over the Korean conflict the following June, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson admitted that in the usual sense of the word there is a war” in Korea
(Fisher, Libya and War 2). Subsequently, in 1953, a federal district court remarked that in
the eyes of a majority of the American public, there was little doubt that “the conflict now
raging in Korea can be anything but war” (Fisher, Libya and War 2). Truman’s practice of
playing games with his words to hide the true nature of his military actions from
Congress and the public subsequently became a tradition of the office itself.
It is important to note that while President Truman sought to push presidential war
power to indefinite bounds in the absence of meaningful congressional opposition, the
federal judiciary did not allow all of Truman’s abuses to go unchecked. In the midst of
the Korean War in April of 1952, American steelworkers threatened to go on strike for
higher wages against the steel companies of the United States (Justia). As steel was
believed to be an essential part of the American war effort in Korea, President Truman
issued an executive order commanding Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize
control of the Nation’s steel mills (Justia). Sawyer subsequently directed the steel
companies to comply with Truman’s order in accordance with governmental regulations.
Just as in the case of initiating American military action within the Korean conflict,
Truman failed to request prior approval from Congress. Rather, upon the issuance of his
order, he informed Congress of his unilateral move to seize a major sect of American
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industry (Law Library). Congress, however, did nothing to impair Truman’s order (Law
Library). When several steel companies led by Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company
were granted a preliminary injunction by the U.S. District Court of Columbia barring
Truman’s executive authority to seize and control the steel mills, the Supreme Court took
up the case in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer (1952). In his defense,
Truman cited prior presidential precedent and the executive authority vested to him as
commander in chief and by Article II of the Constitution as appropriate grounds for his
actions (C-Span). The Supreme Court, however, did not concur with Truman’s argument.
In a landmark 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the institutional balance of power
between the branches, ruling that nothing within the Constitution allowed the president to
seize property during wartime without prior congressional statutory authorization (Justia).
While prior rulings such as Milligan, Prize, Quirin, and Korematsu enabled expansive
presidential powers in wartime, the Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown serves as a
reminder that such powers are not without limitation. That limitation is Congress.
Nonetheless, successive presidents continued to follow Roosevelt and Truman’s
seemingly unopposed example by pushing the limits of executive war power authority in
the decades to follow. In response to a series of “provocative political and military
actions” by the Chinese Communist government towards Formosa (Taiwan), President
Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a message to Congress on January 24th, 1955 (Elsea
and Weed 8). In his message, Eisenhower argued that the “danger” posed by communist
aggression “to the security of our country,” the Pacific, could not wait for United Nations
approval (Elsea and Weed 8). Rather, Eisenhower contended that the circumstances
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necessitated military action to protect the interests of the United States by assuring the
“security of Formosa and the Pescadores” (Elsea and Weed 8). While Eisenhower
appealed to Congress to authorize the use of military force to “make clear the unified and
serious intentions of our Government, our Congress and our people,” he contended that
through his constitutional powers as commander in chief, he would not hesitate “to take
whatever emergency action might be forced upon us to protect the rights and security of
the United States” in the absence of such approval (Elsea and Weed 8). Five days later,
Congress passed legislation that authorized Eisenhower’s ambitions to use military force
with no objections to his assertive right to initiate military operations through executive
authority (Elsea and Weed 8).
Following in with the line with the tradition of his predecessors, when President
Lyndon B. Johnson assumed power in 1963, he brought his own presumptions of the
presidential prerogative regarding the powers of war. According to Johnson, the president
was to be the ultimate “decider” of the national government and the public, who were
predisposed through the electoral process to grant the office full deference in matters of
war (Nelson 127). Following a repulsed torpedo attack against the USS Maddox, a U.S.
Navy destroyer, in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2nd, 1964, Johnson would quickly begin
to personify that role (Elsea and Weed 9). Two days later, in the wake of spotty reports of
additional attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, Johnson unilaterally ordered
U.S. military aircraft to bomb North Vietnamese “gunboats and certain supporting
facilities” which were believed to be in connection with the attacks on U.S. forces (Elsea
and Weed 9). The next day, with no meaningful evidence regarding the supposed
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“attacks” on U.S. forces by North Vietnamese forces, an enraged Johnson turned to
Congress for their “opinion” on the matter (Nelson 128). In his appeal to Congress on
August 5th, 1961, Johnson deliberately used stealth and deception to push Congress
towards authorizing military action through what would eventually be known as the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution (1964) (Elsea and Weed 10). According to the Gulf of Tonkin, a
joint resolution enacted on August 10th, 1964, Congress approved and supported “the
determination of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression” to “promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast
Asia” (Elsea and Weed 10). By falling prey to Johnson’s emotional appeal, Congress fell
into his trap by authorizing broad presidential war powers in the Vietnam War. Afforded
with unprecedented broad authority to do so, in the two years following the enactment of
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson dispatched 200,000 U.S. troops to Vietnam in the
absence of a formal declaration of war (Spector). Despite major efforts by the Johnson
Administration to persuade the public and Congress that the war was being won, by 1968
American forces were bogged down in their efforts to subdue the North Vietnamese
communist threat (Spector). As more Americans were called into service and the
casualties rose, the American public became increasingly disillusioned with the war effort
in Vietnam (Spector). In the face of enormous public opposition to the Vietnam War,
Johnson did not seek reelection in 1968 (Spector).
President Johnson’s successor, Richard Nixon, was elected largely on a campaign
promise to end the war and bring American forces home (Nelson 130-131). By May of
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1969, President Nixon began announcing his plans to begin the withdraw of nearly half a
million U.S. military personnel stationed in Vietnam and his ongoing success for peace in
the region (Zeisberg 181). Nonetheless, such promises of withdrawal and peace to
Congress and the public were marred with lies and deception, for Nixon had already
succumbed to the tradition of his predecessors (Zeisberg 146). Two months prior, Nixon
had unilaterally expanded America’s role in the conflict by beginning unauthorized
military operations in Vietnam’s western neighbor, Cambodia. Despite being officially
neutral in the conflict, Nixon believed the Cambodian government had been covertly
operating as a conduit for the communist war effort against the United States and began a
secret bombing campaign throughout Cambodia in March of 1969 (Zeisberg 146-147).
As America’s role in the Vietnam War continued to swell under Nixon, Congress
finally began to fight back against its own passivity towards the presidential expansion of
war powers and the expansion of the conflict. Upon a reexamination of the circumstances
pertaining to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
argued that Congress had not meant to accommodate such a war through its
authorization, but had only granted such broad presidential authorization as a means of
preventing the war itself (Nelson 131). According to the report, Congress had made an
erroneous personal judgment as to how the President would execute the Resolution when
it should have been making an institutional judgment “as to what any President would do
with so great an acknowledgment of power, and, (…) as to whether, under the
Constitution, Congress had a right to grant or concede the authority in question” (Rotter
77).
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In light of the report and increased public pressure, Congress began to take action
to inhibit the presidency from expanding the Nation’s military involvement in the region
through its constitutional power over appropriations. In December of 1969, Congress
moved to reassert their constitutional powers over war by amending a defense bill to deny
the necessary funding to prohibit the use of U.S. ground forces in neighboring Laos and
Thailand (Zelizer). Despite Congress’ move to restrict further U.S. involvement in the
region, Nixon continued his campaign against neutral Cambodia. Relying on the broad
presidential authorities established through the precedent of his predecessors, Nixon
announced the American public on April 30th, 1970, that U.S. ground forces had crossed
the Cambodian border to destroy North Vietnamese communist refuges and forces in the
country (Zelizer). In response to Nixon’s blatant disregard of public and congressional
sentiments, Congress extended their previous amendment in June to prohibit funding
necessary for U.S. ground force operations in Cambodia (Zelizer).
Despite repeated objections from the Nixon administration that such actions
would inhibit his “lawful responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces,”
Congress continued reasserting its constitutional powers over war (Zelizer). In 1971,
Congress passed the Defense Procurement Authorization Act, which declared that the
United States intended “to terminate at the earliest practicable date all military operations
of the United States in Indochina” (Nelson 132). While Nixon would eventually sign
these congressional actions into law, he continued to warn that such were dangerous
encroachments on his “lawful responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces”
(Zelizer). Through signing statements, Nixon stated that these encroachments were
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without “binding force or effect” and would have no effect on the pursuance of the
policies he had enacted as commander in chief (Nelson 132).
While Nixon’s predecessors were able to wield the Nation’s military forces with
no meaningful opposition to their assertive right, as demonstrated by the acts of Congress
to limit the expansion of U.S. forces in the surrounding regions of Vietnam through
1969-1971, it took a vastly unpopular war to finally push Congress to reassert their war
power tradition. After much debate and deliberations on the matter, in 1973, Congress
passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR) to limit presidential war powers (Fisher, Pres.
Wars). Nixon promptly vetoed the Resolution as “an encroachment upon his
constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief” (Fisher, Uncons. Pres. Wars 21).
Nixon’s veto was nonetheless immediately overridden in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate (Nelson 132). According to the War Powers Resolution of
1973, the president is obligated to notify Congress within forty-eight hours of ordering
the Nation’s armed forces into action. In the absence of a formal declaration of war or
other statutory authorization from Congress, the bill prohibits the Nation’s armed forces
from remaining deployed for more than sixty days (Yale). On top of the sixty-day
deployment window, the bill also permits an additional thirty days for withdrawing
American forces (Yale). In total, the Resolution allows for the deployment of the Nation’s
military forces for a ninety-day duration. According to Section 2 of the WPR, the purpose
of the Resolution is to:
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fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United States and
insure that the collective judgement of both the Congress and the President will
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances. (Yale)
Table 3: Post-WPR Noted Use of Military Force through 2000
President

Year

Location

Ford

1975

Cambodia

1983-84

Lebanon

1983

Grenada

1986

Libya

1989

Panama

1990

Saudi Arabia

1991

Kuwait/Iraq

1993-98

Iraq

1993

Somalia

1994-95

Bosnia

1998

Afghanistan

1998

Sudan

1999

Yugoslavia

Ronald Reagan

George H.W. Bush

Bill Clinton

While the War Powers Resolution seeks to fulfill the intent of the Framers
according to its stated purpose, a historical investigation into its usage demonstrates that
it has failed to do so (Table 3). Since its enactment, the assertive nature in which
presidents have committed the Nation’s military forces into action has steadily increased
rather than decrease (Schonberg 134). In comparison with the Constitution, the WPR
grants the president far greater unilateral authority over war powers, specifically through
the president’s ability to deploy American forces for up to ninety days without
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congressional authorization. The president is thus essentially enabled to wage war
unilaterally, in a fashion more reflective of the British monarch than the Founders’
intentions. Initially, according to Section 5(c) of the Resolution, Congress could negate
unilateral expansionism by permitting Congress to end military action at any point by
majority-vote through a concurrent resolution of Congress (Yale). Following the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, however, the
president could veto any such resolution from Congress, which thus required a veto-proof
congressional majority to end military action (Kosar).
In addition, the “collective judgement” sought by the Resolution has been
repeatedly impeded by questions regarding its constitutionality. Since its enactment in
1973, no president has ever formally acknowledged the War Powers Resolution’s
constitutionality (Carter 101). Instead, each president has taken the position of President
Nixon, that the Resolution is in direct violation of Article V of the Constitution, as the
only way to appropriately alter the constitutional powers of the executive and legislative
branches are through amendments to the Constitution itself (Cornell). In accordance with
the belief that the WPR is not legally binding, almost every president has ignored citing
the Resolution’s Section 4(a)(1) provision to Congress when introducing American
military forces into action, which effectively begins the ninety-day clock for deployment
(Nelson 132). In reality, only one president has reported military action to Congress
under Section 4(a)(1) provision, President Gerald Ford. In 1975, President Ford reported
to Congress that he had ordered military operations against the Khmer Rouge, in
retaliation for their illegal seizure of the SS Mayaguez, a United States merchant vessel
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(Nelson 133). By the time Ford had reported the military action, however, the operation
was already completed (Nelson 133).
While Ford had complied with the WPR, President Ronald Reagan’s term in
office would reignite presidential war powers expansionism. In July of 1982, President
Reagan announced that he would be sending U.S. forces to Lebanon as part of a
multinational peacekeeping operation permitted by the Lebanese government (Elsea and
Weed 10). When Reagan introduced U.S. Marines to Lebanon on August 25th, 1982, he
reported to Congress military action but did not cite Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR, but the
prior agreement with the Lebanese government which did not stipulate combat operations
(Elsea and Weed 10). Following the departure of the fist dispatch of U.S. Marines from
Lebanon on September 10th, Reagan sent an additional dispatch of Marines to the
country ten days later. In a message to Congress on September 29th, Reagan announced
the second dispatch of U.S. Marines, but yet again did not cite Section 4(a)(1) of the
WPR, stating that their presence was not due to a combat role (Elsea and Weed 10). As
U.S. Marines began to be killed or wounded as a result of the deployment order in
Lebanon, Reagan continuously failed to cite Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR to Congress.
Believing that such hostilities were not directed at American forces, Reagan insisted to
Congress that his actions were “consistent with” the provisions of the WPR (Rubner
637). As tensions began to rise over the deployment, Reagan agreed to compromise with
Congress through the enactment of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution on
October 12th, 1983 (Elsea and Weed 11). The Lebanon Resolution invoked Section 4(a)
(1) of the WPR and authorized U.S. Marines to remain in the country for 18 additional
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months (Elsea and Weed 11). In a signing statement on the bill, however, Reagan iterated
“that I do not and cannot cede any of the authority vested in me under the Constitution as
President and as Commander in Chief of United States Armed Forces,” and that his
signature did not acknowledge that his “constitutional authority can be impermissibly
infringed by statute” (Elsea and Weed 11).
Two weeks later, under the support of a multinational coalition of Caribbean
states, Reagan ordered 1,900 U.S. Army and Marine personnel to invade Grenada on
October 25th, 1983 (Rubner 637). In a letter to Congress that afternoon, Reagan reported
the action as “consistent with the War Powers Resolution” (Rubner 637). While he
reported the action to Congress, just as in the case of Lebanon, Reagan deliberately chose
to play word games with Congress over the true nature of his actions. In his report to
Congress, he did not acknowledge that his reporting of the action was in pursuance of the
WPR, nor did he explicitly convey that U.S. forces in Grenada were being introduced to
hostilities (Rubner 637-638). Reagan knew that in the absence of congressional
authorization, had Congress been notified of the prior, he would have automatically
triggered the Resolution’s Section 4(a)(1) sixty-day requirement for the termination of
military action in Grenada. While Congress subsequently scrambled to enact legislation
which statutorily proclaimed Reagan’s message to initiate the sixty-day timeline, all
attempts were in vain (Rubner 638-640). Nonetheless, Reagan’s military initiative in
Grenada was completed in less than sixty days (Fisher, Pres. Wars from Truman 21).
Reagan would again play games with Congress through his bombing of Libya in 1986. In
his message reporting to Congress, Reagan yet again maintained that his actions were
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“consistent with War Powers Resolution” (Fisher, Pres. Wars from Truman 21), and
further stated that:
These strikes were conducted in the exercise of our right of self-defense under
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter… These self-defense measures were
undertaken pursuant to my authority under the Constitution, including my
authority as Commander in Chief… (Burgin 222)
It is important to note that while Reagan was able to openly avoid the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution, as touched on earlier, there was indeed
pushback from Congress. In every instance, members of Congress took action to voice
their disdain for the unilateral expanse of presidential war powers under undertaken in
spite of the intentions of the WPR. These congressional actions included: introducing
reactive legislation concentrated on the executive interpretation and execution of the
Resolution, introducing preemptive legislation aimed at disabling the executive’s ability
to bypass the Resolution’s requirements, floor hearings and statements responding to
presidential action, and letters to Reagan himself (Burgin 225-230). Although far less
common than the previous congressional actions, in several instances groups of
legislators tried to force Reagan into complying with the WPR through direct lawsuits:
Crockett v. Reagan (1982), Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan (1983), Conyers v. Reagan
(1984) and Lowry v. Reagan (1987). While these cases dealt mostly with procedural
questions and congressional prerogatives, each case was dismissed by the courts on the
grounds of the political question doctrine or the doctrine of equitable discretion (Burgin
231). While examples of congressional action against Reagan’s post-WPR usage of the
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Nation’s armed forces exist, none were able to meaningfully oppose the President’s
ability to unilaterally wield the Nation’s military.
Under President George H.W. Bush, the Nation’s military would yet again be
thrust into conflict following unilateral action. In what was the largest deployment of
U.S. forces since the enactment of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, under the
direction of President H.W. Bush, U.S. forces invaded Panama and attacked Panamanian
defense forces on December 20, 1989 (Burgin 232). While H.W. Bush decided to order
the attack days prior, no effort had been made to consult congressional opinions on the
matter (Burgin 232-233). Rather, in the hours before the invasion commenced, the
executive informed leaders in Congress of the incursion to come (Burgin 233). While he
would eventually send a report to Congress, H.W. Bush did so in the traditional fashion
of his predecessors, by stating that his report was “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” (Burgin 233). Additionally, H.W. Bush disregarded the Resolution’s
requirement to inform Congress of military action within forty-eight hours by filing the
report days after the invasion began (Burgin 233). Unlike Reagan’s previous use of
military action, which failed to abide by the War Powers Resolution, H.W. Bush’s
invasion of Panama was met with seemingly no public opposition from Congress (Burgin
233-234). Nonetheless, H.W. Bush’s military initiative in Panama was subsequently
completed within sixty days (Fisher, Uncons. Pres. Wars 21).
A year later, in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait under the direction of
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, President H.W. Bush yet again took unilateral action. A
week after the Iraqi invasion, H.W. Bush unilaterally deployed U.S. forces to Saudi
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Arabia to prevent further acts of Iraqi aggression in the region (Elsea and Weed 12).
Noting that he did not believe the possibility of hostilities were imminent in his report to
Congress, he repeated that such action was “consistent with the War Powers
Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 12). By the end of 1990, there was over 350,000 U.S.
military personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (Elsea and Weed 12). With the
probability of war in the absence of congressional authorization growing, fifty-three
members of Congress brought suit against the President for his failure to seek the prior
consultation of Congress in Dellums v. Bush (1990) (Shonberg 137). Before the U.S.
District Court of Columbia, the U.S. Justice Department argued in Dellums that the
president had the authority to take offensive actions against Iraq without the prior consent
of Congress (Fisher ). In its decision, however, the court found no credit to the Justice
Department’s argument, stating that if the president:
had the sole power to determine that any particular offensive military operation,
no matter how vast, does not constitute war-making but only an offensive
military attack, the congressional power to declare war will be at the mercy of a
semantic decision by the Executive. Such an “interpretation” would evade the
plain meaning of the Constitution, and it cannot stand. (Fisher)
In a similar fashion to the congressional lawsuits examined during the Reagan-era, the
case was nonetheless dismissed by the court. Specifically, the case was dismissed on the
grounds that the “Court would not be a surrogate for Congress, or a fallback for
legislators whose views were not shared by a majority of both houses” (Shonberg 137).
On November 29th, 1990, the United Nations authorized member states to
implement various U.N. Resolutions seeking to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait by all
means necessary (Elsea and Weed 12). Using the United Nation’s authorization to gain
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support, by January 1991, President H.W. Bush had secured the support of an
international coalition to rid Kuwait of its Iraqi problem (Elsea and Weed 12). Armed
with international support, H.W. Bush sent a letter to Congress requesting a supporting
resolution to authorize the deployment of U.S. forces “to protect America’s security” in
pursuance of the United Nations Resolutions (Elsea and Weed 13). Within his message,
H.W. Bush notably did not ask for the authorization of Congress, but its support. Days
later, in a televised interview, H.W. Bush reasserted his claim that in the absence of
congressional authorization, he had the constitutional “authority to fully implement the
United Nations resolutions” (Elsea and Weed 13).
In the wake of this assertion of unilateral presidential authority, Congress
nonetheless passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution,” to pursue the U.N. Resolutions on January 12, 1991 (Elsea and Weed 13).
Within the joint resolution, however, Congress listed several stipulations towards H.W.
Bush’s potential use of military force. According to Section 2(b) of the Resolution, the
president was to inform Congress of all diplomatic efforts, past and present, undertaken
by the United States to ensure Iraqi compliance as a precondition to the use of the
Nation’s military forces. If it was clear to Congress that the United States had exhausted
all diplomatic means to ensure compliance, the president would then be enabled to
execute the “specific statutory authority” of the Resolution according to “the meaning of
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 13). Following the
initiation of military action, the president would then be required to report to Congress
every 60 days on ongoing efforts to ensure Iraqi compliance (Elsea and Weed 13). While
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H.W. Bush would sign the Resolution into law and commence operations against Iraq, he
would yet advance the presidential tradition of disregarding the role of Congress in the
process, as demonstrated through his signing statement:
my request for congressional support did not, and my signing this resolution does
not, constitute any change in the long-standing positions of the executive branch
on either the President’s constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to
defend vital U.S. interests or the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.
(Elsea and Weed 13)
Following George H.W. Bush, President Bill Clinton yet again underscored the
erosion of the Founders’ war powers intent. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991,
Clinton would be the first president since Roosevelt to serve the Nation while not being
directly threatened by the Cold War and the geopolitical spread of communism. With the
Soviet threat in the rear-view mirror, an emboldened United States was now ready to
assume the role of the world’s sole hegemonic power under Clinton. Although Clinton
had campaigned against H.W. Bush’s war policies, he would soon find himself emulating
and expanding on the practice as a harbinger of what was to come (Yarhi-Milo 227-228).
When Clinton was inaugurated in 1993, he inherited H.W. Bush’s military
initiatives in Iraq and Somalia. In both countries, Clinton would unilaterally escalate U.S.
diplomatic tensions through the use of force without congressional authorization. In June
of 1993, President Clinton unilaterally ordered the launching of twenty-three tomahawk
cruise-missiles against Iraq’s intelligence command center in Baghdad in retaliation for a
failed assassination attempt against H.W. Bush in Kuwait (Adler 159). As for the
authority to ignore Congress and unilaterally order the strike, Clinton cited his

74

commander in chief power and his “constitutional authority” to conduct U.S. foreign
policy (Adler 160).
In Somalia, Clinton would yet again escalate tensions and put American forces at
risk without the consent of Congress. Following his defeat in the presidential election in
1992, in a final act as commander in chief, H.W. Bush sent U.S. forces abroad to pursue a
U.N. humanitarian effort in Somalia known as “Operation Restore Hope” in December of
1992 (Klarevas 523). Following the deaths of twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers in
Somalia, Clinton shifted from the nature of the U.S. mission from peaceful means to
military action against the self-proclaimed president of Somalia, Mohamed Farrah Aidid
(Yarhi-Milo 230). On October 3rd, Clinton ordered a raid to capture several of Aidid’s
top aids in what would be known as the Battle of Mogadishu, or “Black Hawk
Down” (Yarhi-Milo 231). In ordering the retaliatory attack on Aidid’s forces, Clinton
nonetheless offered no legal or constitutional justification (Adler 160). The raid
ultimately resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. servicemen in a disaster for the Nation
and the Clinton Administration (Yarhi-Milo 231). Enraged, following the incident,
members of Congress began calling for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Somalia (Yarhi-Milo 231). Despite opposition from Congress, Clinton nonetheless
continued to build up U.S. forces in Somalia in the following months (Yarhi-Milo 231).
Following the disaster in Somalia, Clinton became an indicator of presidential
practice to come through his adaptation to the changing nature of warfare. Rather than
directly place U.S. lives at risk through boots on the ground and face the potential
political costs of doing so, Clinton began extensively using long-range bombing and
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tomahawk cruise-missile strikes to further the office’s grasp over the Nation’s war powers
throughout his presidency. Here are four such examples:
1. 1994 and 1995: Clinton implemented this strategy of indirect warfare through his
bombing campaign of targets throughout Bosnia. All the while, Clinton ordered the
bombings, he never once sought the prior authorization of Congress to do so. Rather,
Clinton yet again cited his “constitutional authority” as commander in chief and prior
“authorization” from U.N. resolutions and NATO allies as the means to do so (Adler
160-161).
2. September 3rd, 1996: Following an Iraqi military offensive against the Kurdish city
of Irbil in northern Iraq, Clinton unilaterally ordered a tomahawk cruise-missile strike
on various Iraqi military targets in southern Iraq (Fisher, Against Iraq). According to
Clinton, the missile strike— which coincided with his 1996 reelection campaign—
was authorized by prior U.N. resolutions on Iraq (Fisher, Against Iraq).
3. On August 20th, 1998: Clinton yet again took unilateral action by ordering tomahawk
cruise-missile strikes on suspected al-Qaeda terrorist sanctuaries within Afghanistan
and Sudan. Following these missile strikes, Clinton chose yet again to offer no
constitutional justification for his unilateral acts of war-making abroad (Adler
161-162).
4. December 16-19th, 1998: Following the failure of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to
comply with a prior agreement to grant U.N. inspectors broad authority to investigate
various Iraqi installations suspected to house weapons of mass destruction, Clinton
unilaterally ordered an extensive bombing campaign throughout the country— amidst
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his impeachment trial. In defense of his unilateral order, Clinton asserted that Iraq had
failed to comply with U.N. weapons inspectors and that the missile strikes were
coordinated to “attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
programs” (Adler 162).
While President Clinton’s actions in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and
Sudan all point to his disregard for the Founders’ intentions and congressional authority,
the bombing campaign of Yugoslavia serves as Clinton’s defining assertion of unilateral
power. On March 24th, 1999, in conjunction with eighteen NATO allies, the United
States began a bombing campaign throughout Yugoslavia during the Kosovo war (Adler
163). Unlike the 1994 and 1995 bombing campaigns of Bosnia which were also carried
out by the U.S. and NATO allies, the United Nations Security Council explicitly failed to
endorse military action in Yugoslavia prior to the operation and thus failed to deliver
perceived additional “authority” to Clinton (Fisher, Basic Principles 334). In ordering the
attack, which constituted the largest deployment of U.S. airpower since the Vietnam War,
Clinton yet again deferred to his “constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief” and
did not seek prior congressional authorization to use the Nation’s military forces (Adler,
163). When Clinton first informed Congress of his order to bomb Yugoslavia on March
26th, 1999, he unsurprisingly reported to Congress that the unilateral action was
“consistent with the War Powers Resolution” (Damrosch 137). Unlike prior instances in
which presidents unilaterally engaged in acts of warfare, however, Clinton’s campaign in
Yugoslavia was the first instance in American history in which a president waged war in
the face of direct congressional refusal to authorize a war (Adler 156). A month following
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Clinton’s order in April, the House of Representatives defeated a joint resolution
declaring a state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Adler 163). Most notably, however, is the fate of a congressional measure to
authorize the president to U.S. air forces and missile strikes against Yugoslavia. While it
was passed by the Senate, it failed to pass through the House of Representatives by a tie
vote of 213-213 (Adler 163). According to the Constitution and historical practice,
congressional authorizations required the approval of both chambers of the legislature for
the president to be authorized to use military force. Through its failure to pass the House
of Representatives, Congress had refused to authorize Clinton’s military air campaign in
Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, Clinton continued to wage his war.
In an effort to reassert the role of Congress in authorizing the use of military
force, in Campbell v. Clinton (1999), numerous members of Congress filed suit against
the President on claims that his military actions in Yugoslavia violated the Constitution
and the War Powers Resolution (Damrosch 138). Falling in line with the precedent of
presidential practice, the Clinton Administration argued that the members of Congress
lacked standing to sue on constitutional or statutory claims, the issues lacked ripeness and
that the cased should be dismissed under the political question doctrine (Damrosch 138).
Additionally, the Clinton Administration argued that congressional funding was implicit
authorization for the use of military force, despite the War Powers Resolution explicitly
stating otherwise (Damrosch 138). In reaching its decision, the U.S. District Court of
Columbia held in Campbell that this was a political question on which lacked
justiciability, thus offering no judicial remedy to Clinton’s extraconstitutional actions.
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As demonstrated through this section, beginning with Roosevelt and Truman, the
institutional balance of the Nation’s war powers deviated far from the Founders’
intentions throughout the twentieth century. Following the enactment of the Truman
Doctrine in 1947, the American tradition of isolation was renounced for a new path of
global interventionism to negate the spread of the Soviet threat and communism. In
Vietnam, Presidents Johnson and Nixon infamously seized on the broad authority granted
by Congress through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and vastly expanded America’s role
in the unpopular conflict according to their “constitutional authority” as commander in
chief. In 1973, Congress tried to vindicate itself from the Vietnam debacle and prevent
further expansion of presidential war powers through the War Powers Resolution. In spite
of congressional ambitions, however, presidents increasingly asserted broad independent
authority to deploy U.S. forces under the auspice of prior U.N., NATO “authority,” or
their inherent constitutional authority. Following the collapse of the Soviet threat and the
end of the Cold War in 1991, presidential use of the Nation’s military forces remained
essential in maintaining the global hegemonic role of the United States. As the nature of
warfare changed through technological and political developments, by the mid-1990s,
America’s mandate was increasingly cemented through foreign bombing campaigns and
cruise-missile strikes under the unilateral order of President Bill Clinton. When faced
with these increasingly broad assertions of presidential war power throughout the
twentieth century, Congress commonly appeased the president or failed to mount a
meaningful legal or political challenge (i.e., impeachment) in response.
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B. 2001-Present
Shortly after assuming the presidency in January of 2001, newly-inaugurated
President George W. Bush would soon be required to exercise the role of commander in
chief and lead the Nation’s military forces. On September 11th, 2001, a series of
coordinated terrorist attacks on the United States destroyed the World Trade Center,
significantly damaged the Pentagon, and claimed nearly three-thousand lives (Schonberg
116). In response to the most deadly attack on U.S. soil since the Japanese bombing of
Pearl Harbor in 1941, President George W. Bush proclaimed that the United States would
use “all resources to conquer” the enemy responsible for these “acts of war” against
“freedom and democracy” (Elsea and Weed 14). Within days following the attack,
Congress was ready to grant George W. Bush the resources he desired by joint resolution.
On the morning of September 14th, the Senate passed S.J. Res. 23, entitled the
“Authorization for Use of Military Force” against terror (AUMF), by unanimous 98-0
vote (Elsea and Weed 14). That afternoon, the House of Representatives also passed S.J.
Res. 23 by a vote of 420-1, after rejecting a motion that would require the President to
report his actions to Congress every sixty days pursuant to the authorization (Elsea and
Weed 14). The only dissenting vote within the House on S.J. Res. 23 came from
Representative Barbara Lee (D-CA), who believed that the resolution would serve as a
blank check for the further expansion of presidential war powers (Shonberg 118). Section
2 of S.J. Res. 23 outlines the scope of the authorization within two brief subsections.
According to Section 2(a) of S.J. Res. 23, the President is authorized to:
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use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations, or persons. (Shonberg 116)
The following subsection of S.J. Res. 23 Section 2(b) outlines the authorization's War
Powers Resolution requirements. According to Section 2(b)(1), Congress declares that the
resolution “is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” Additionally, Section 2(b)(2) declares that
“Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers
Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 15). On September 18th, 2001, President George W. Bush
signed S.J. Res. 23 into law (P.L. 107-40; 50 U.S.C. §1541 note). When signing the 2001
AUMF into law, in line with presidential tradition W. Bush stated that “in signing this
resolution, I maintain the longstanding position of the executive branch regarding the
President's constitutional authority to use force, including the Armed Forces of the United
States, and regarding the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution” (Elsea and
Weed 15).
Following his signature, President George W. Bush was quick to implement the
broad authority granted to him and began deploying U.S. forces. By September 24th, W.
Bush notified Congress regarding the first deployment of U.S. forces into “a number of
foreign nations” throughout the “Central and Pacific Command areas of
operations” (Weed, Pres. References 4). On October 9th, 2001, W. Bush notified
Congress that “Operation Enduring Freedom” had commenced in Afghanistan and that
major U.S. combat operations had begun against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Weed, Pres.
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References 4). Shortly after the United States' commencement of Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan, U.S. and coalition forces effectively defeated Taliban rule and
established an interim Afghan government by December of 2001 (Stanley 104). Although
the Taliban government was removed from power, al-Qaeda and Taliban forces remained
through large sects of the country (Stanley 105). Throughout 2002, U.S. and coalition
forces engaged in a series of major combat operations, which ultimately shattered the
military abilities of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan (Stanley 105). On May
1st, 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced an effective end to U.S.
major combat operations in Afghanistan (Stanley 105). U.S. forces remained in
Afghanistan following Rumsfeld's announcement to “prevent a political and military
resurgence of the Taliban” and al-Qaeda, oversee the implementation of the new
government and to “train Afghan security forces” (Stanley 105). The security mission,
however, would prove disastrous as the remaining Taliban and al-Qaeda forces were able
to reorganize along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and begin insurgency operations
against U.S. and coalition forces within months (Stanley 105). Despite numerous military
offensives since the Taliban's resurgence in 2003, U.S. forces continue to remain in a
state of perpetual warfare against the Taliban and other Islamic insurgent groups in
Afghanistan under the authority of the 2001 AUMF (as of May 2020).
The year following the invasion of Afghanistan, President George W. Bush began
to reinforce the claims of his predecessor that despite being defeated by the United States
in 1991, Iraq and its government continued to pose a serious threat to the interests and
security of the United States (Elsea and Weed 16). Specifically, W. Bush maintained that
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despite U.N. resolutions following the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had failed to cease its
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs (Elsea and Weed 16). On September
12th, 2002, W. Bush addressed the U.N. General Assembly and asserted that if Iraq
continued to ignore its obligations, the United States would not hesitate to take action to
enforce the U.N. resolutions (Elsea and Weed 16). Following W. Bush's U.N. speech,
Congress began crafting legislation that would allow the president to take action against
the supposed threat towards the United States. Meanwhile, the W. Bush Administration
continued to further claims of an Iraqi threat, by connecting al-Qaeda terrorist operations
with Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Regime (Fisher, Dec. on War 397-401). On the eve of an
important House vote regarding authorization against Iraq, Bush reported to the Nation
that Iraq had actively engaged in training members of al-Qaeda in “bomb making and
poisons and deadly gasses” on October 7th (Fisher, Dec. on War 400). By October 11th,
2002, both the House of Representatives and the Senate had passed the “Authorization
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution” (H.J.Res. 114) and sent it to the White
House for final approval (Elsea and Weed 17). According to Section 3 of the Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, the President is authorized to use the
Nation's military forces “as he determines to be necessary and appropriate” to “defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq” and to
“enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq” (Elsea
and Weed 17). As a predicate to the president's use of force, the resolution stipulated
periodic reports to Congress regarding ongoing operations and that the resolution was
“intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of Section 5(b)
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of the War Powers Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 17). In signing the resolution into law on
October 16th, 2002, W. Bush yet again provided that the signing of such an authorization
does not affect the “President's constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent, or
respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on the constitutionality of the
War Powers Resolution” (Elsea and Weed 17).
Beginning in March of 2003, U.S. and coalition forces invaded Iraq to topple
Saddam Hussein's regime in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Council on Foreign Relations). In
just over a month, by mid-April, U.S. and coalition forces had removed Saddam Hussein
from power and instituted a new provisional Iraqi government (Council on Foreign
Relations). On May 1st, 2003, before a crowd of U.S. Naval personnel aboard the USS
Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared, “The battle of Iraq is one victory
in a war on terror that began on September 11, 2001, and still goes on” (Bash).
Nevertheless, the conflict in Iraq further escalated following initial claims of an American
victory. Just as in the case of the American effort in Afghanistan, following an initial
victory, U.S. military forces became bogged down in a perpetual fight against radical
Islamic insurgency groups in Iraq (Council on Foreign Relations). After more than seven
years of war and 4,400 U.S. casualties in Iraq, President Barack Obama announced a
formal end to United States combat operations in Iraq on August 10th, 2010 (Council on
Foreign Relations). In his address to the Nation, President Obama reinforced that despite
the imminent withdraw of U.S. troops the following year, the U.S. would not abandon
Iraq (Council on Foreign Relations). When the final U.S. forces left Iraq on December
18th, 2011, the Iraq War official came to a close (Council on Foreign Relations).
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In passing the 2001 AUMF against terror, Congress essentially afforded the presidency a
blank check to wage indefinite warfare abroad. While the 2001 AUMF is sparse on
details, it affords an unprecedented amount of broad military authority to the president in
comparison with previous congressional authorizations by not only authorizing the
president to “use all necessary and appropriate” military force against nations but also
against organizations and persons for an indefinite duration (Shonberg 116). According to
the authorization, the president alone may determine the nations, organizations, and
persons that “planned, authorized, committed, (…) aided” or “harbored” those
responsible for the in the September 11th, 2001 attacks (Shonberg 116). Additionally, the
authorization enables the president to use military force to prevent future terrorist attacks
against the United States by those in association with those who perpetrated the
September 11th, 2001 attacks (Shonberg 116). While President George W. Bush was
quick to name al-Qaeda and its members as the organization and persons responsible, as
well as the Taliban government in Afghanistan as the nation responsible for harboring alQaeda and its members, these actors are nonetheless omitted from the language of the
2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 4).
Since its passage in 2001, Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and
Donald J. Trump have used the 2001 AUMF on terror to entrench the United States
within a massive global “war on terror” and further the expansion of presidential war
powers despite Congress and the Founders' institutional balance. Shortly after the
invasion of Afghanistan, on November 13th, 2001, George W. Bush issued a Military
Order entitled the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War
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Against Terrorism,” which established that terrorist suspects would be detained and tried
by military commissions (Weed, Pres. References 37). As a legal basis for his Order, W.
Bush cited “the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces of the United States” and the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 37).
Beginning in September of 2002, the W. Bush Administration began to expand U.S.
counterterrorism efforts outside of Afghanistan through the deployment of U.S. forces for
military training, advising, and assisting (Philippines, Georgia, and Yemen), operations
against al-Qaeda in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti), maritime interception operations on the
high seas (Central and European Command Areas), and secure detention operations in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Weed, Pres. References 6). In each report to Congress from
2002 to 2003, George W. Bush informed Congress that his actions were in accordance
with his Article II authority and consistent with the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References
5). Additionally, the President stated that such reports to Congress were consistent with
the War Powers Resolution (Weed, Pres. References 5).
In George W. Bush's reports to Congress from March of 2004 to December of
2008, the President continued reporting additional deployments of U.S. forces throughout
the globe. These notifications include additional deployments throughout Africa
(including combat-equipped forces), launching both air and sea strikes against al-Qaeda
targets in Somalia, deployments to enhance counterterrorism capabilities of “friends and
allies,” U.S. armed forces working with “friends and allies in areas around the globe,”
and the extension of maritime interception operations on the high seas throughout the
globe (Weed, Pres. References 8-16) Throughout this span, W. Bush only briefly
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mentioned the 2001 AUMF once in reference to his reporting being “consistent with the
2001 AUMF and the WPR” (Weed, Pres. References 8). Beginning with the March 2004
notification, W. Bush began to list the operations against terror under a Section entitled
"The Global War on Terror," and that combat operations in Iraq “are a critical part of the
war on terror…” but are nonetheless authorized under the 1991 and 2002 AUMF's against
Iraq (Weed, Pres. References 8). In November of 2004, W. Bush began to characterize
ongoing operations in Iraq within either the “Global War on Terrorism” or other antiterror labeled sections (Weed, Pres. References 8).
As demonstrated throughout the previous paragraphs, the George W. Bush
Administration broadly interpreted the 2001 AUMF by unilaterally ordering the
deployment of U.S. forces and combat operations globally. In addition, the W. Bush
Administration invoked the 2001 AUMF to authorize military detentions of enemy
combatants and U.S. citizens and residents, trials by military commission, and
warrantless surveillance of communications “into and out of the United States of persons
linked to al-Qaeda or related terrorist organizations” despite domestic law (Bradley 630).
Throughout W. Bush's duration in office, his Administration's broad interpretation of
Article II powers and the 2001 AUMF was constantly the subject of debate within the
American public and Congress (Bradley 630).
Throughout his initial presidential campaign, candidate Barack Obama took a
hard-line against President George W. Bush's exercise of war powers. In 2007, when
asked whether the president had the constitutional authority to take military action in the
absence of an “imminent threat” without prior congressional authorization, Obama
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replied, “The President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally
authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or
imminent threat to the nation” (Fisher, Libya Operations 177). Elaborating further,
Obama stated that as commander in chief, the president:
does have a duty to protect and defend the United States. In instances of selfdefense, the President would be within his constitutional authority to act before
advising Congress or seeking its consent. History has shown us time and again,
however, that military action is most successful when it is authorized and
supported by the Legislative branch. It is always preferable to have informed
consent of Congress prior to any military action. (Fisher, Libya Operations 177)
Despite campaigning to do the opposite, upon assuming the presidency in 2009, President
Barack Obama continued to expand on the practices of George W. Bush by increasing the
U.S. military effort against terrorism. In March of 2009, The Obama Administration
stated that its interpretation of the 2001 AUMF was “limited to the authority upon which
the Government is relying to detain the persons now being held at Guantanamo Bay,” and
that the 2001 AUMF was not “meant to define the authority for military operations
generally, or detention in other contexts” (Bradley 635). Nevertheless, as his presidency
progressed, Obama increasingly relied on 2001 AUMF authority. In his first two
notifications to Congress in June and December of 2009, Obama maintained that antiterror deployments and combat operations were in accordance with his Article II
authorities, and only cited the 2001 AUMF as the authority to continue detention
operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Weed, Pres. References 8). From June 2010 to
December 2011, Obama cited that his increase in anti-terror operations was “consistent
with” the 2001 AUMF and the WPR, while continuing to cite detention operations solely
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under the authority of the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 19). In addition to
Guantanamo Bay, Obama expanded detention operations of “al-Qaeda, Taliban, and
associated fighters” to Afghanistan beginning in June of 2011 under the 2001 AUMF
(Weed, Pres. References 21). During his first few years in office, Obama also
dramatically increased the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan from just over 30,000 in
2008 to over 100,000 in 2011 under the 2001 AUMF (Kurtzleben).
While U.S. forces were in the process of withdrawing from Iraq in 2011,
President Obama continued to escalate the U.S. war against terror in Afghanistan and
across the globe. On March 19th, 2011, Obama ordered direct U.S. military action in the
Libyan Civil War (2011) against the ground forces and air defenses of Libyan Prime
Minister Muammar al-Qaddafi without “seeking or obtaining” prior congressional
authorization (Fisher, Libya 176-178). Following in the line of presidential tradition of
unconstitutional war-making, in his notice to Congress two days later on March 21st,
Obama informed Congress that U.S. military forces had commenced operations in Libya
as “authorized by the United Nations Security Council” (Fisher, Libya Operations 179).
Less than a week later, Obama stated in a nationwide address that following the initial
action of U.S. forces in Libya, he would “transfer responsibilities” to NATO allies and
partners (Fisher, Libya Operations 179). The supposed “authorization” cited by Obama,
U.N. Resolution 1973, called for U.N. member action “for the purposes of preparing a
no-fly zone” over Libya (Fisher, Libya Operations 179). As the campaign progressed,
however, it was clear that Obama was not acting in accordance with his own supposed
auspices of authorization. On April 25th, Obama authorized the use of armed Predator
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drones against al-Qaddafi forces (Fisher, Libya Operations 178). In a May 2011 letter to
Congress, Obama appealed to Congress for congressional action supporting his Libya
operations, stating that “even in limited actions such as this,” congressional support
would “demonstrate a unity of purpose among the political branches on this important
national security matter” (Fisher, Libya Operations 178). According to an Obama Justice
Department opinion in 2011, in order for a military conflict to be constituted as a “war”
U.S. military forces must be exposed to “prolonged and substantial military
engagements,” under the threat of significant risk over a significant period” (Fisher,
Libya Operations 180). Thus, according to the Obama Administration, so long as U.S.
casualties remained low in Libya, the military campaign could not be defined as a war
(Fisher, Libya Operations 180).
While the Obama Administration maintained risk as a component that necessitates
congressional authorization, the War Powers Resolution states otherwise. As previously
mentioned, Section 4(a) of the WPR requires the president to report to Congress within
forty-eight hours whenever U.S. forces are introduced “into hostilities or into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,” or
when U.S. forces enter “the territory, air space or waters of a foreign nation, while
equipped for combat” (Yale). Additionally, according to Section 5(b) of the WPR, if the
president has not submitted the required report or has not received congressional
authorization within sixty days prior to the commencement of operations, the president
must terminate “any use of United States Armed Forces” and withdrawal within thirty
days (Yale). When the sixty-day deadline for congressional authorization passed on on
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May 20th, U.S. forces nonetheless remained engaged in military operations (Fisher,
Libya Operations 180). With the final withdrawal deadline of ninety days approaching,
on June 3rd, 2011, the House of Representatives passed H.Res.292, which directed the
President to submit a report within fourteen days providing his justification for not
seeking congressional authorization, as well as the national security interests at risk
interests in Libya (Fisher, Libya Operations 180). In a bipartisan effort on June 13th, the
House of Representatives passed additional legislation voting to block funding to U.S.
military operations in Libya (Kim).
In response to mounting congressional pressure, on June 15th, 2011, the Obama
Administration submitted a report to Congress on its Libyan campaign (Fisher, Libya
Operations 180). According to the report, “the President had the constitutional authority,
as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers,
to direct such limited military operations abroad” in operations which did not constitute a
war (Fisher, Libya Operations 180). Such operations, according to the Obama
Administration were “consistent with the War Powers Resolution and did not under that
law require further congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are
distinct from the kind of ‘hostilities’ contemplated by the Resolution’s sixty-day
termination provision,” as:
U.S. operations [in Libya] do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges
of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground
troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of
escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors. (Fisher, Libya Operations
180)
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Following Obama's report to Congress, the House of Representatives rejected a joint
resolution on June 24th, 2011, which would have authorized military actions in Libya
(Ghattas). Nonetheless, Obama continued to order U.S. forces to engage in illegal
military operations in Libya. Despite claiming American victory in the conflict in August
of 2011, Libya has continued to remain in a state of constant political and social disarray
through a civil war (Thrall). Such is further demonstrated by the fact that five years
following his initial order, the Obama Administration was still unilaterally dropping
bombs within Libya in 2016 (Zenko and Wilson).
While the Iraq War came to a close in December of 2011, the 2002 AUMF against
Iraq continued to remain in effect (Golan-Vilella 62). Just as the 2001 AUMF against
terror, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 also
affords unprecedented broad military authority to the president. In comparison with the
previous 1991 AUMF against Iraq, the granted authority of the 2002 AUMF is not
explicitly limited to previous U.N. resolutions (Elsea and Weed 17). Instead, the 2002
AUMF authority includes both prior U.N. resolutions on Iraq, and those passed until up
until the mandated U.N. expiration date of December 31st, 2008 (Elsea and Weed 17).
Additionally, just as the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF authorizes the president to use the
Nation's military forces in pursuance of the resolution for an indefinite period. In early
2014, the Obama Administration reported that "the Administration supports the repeal of
the Iraq AUMF since it is no longer used for any U.S. Government activities" (BrandonSmith). Nonetheless, that the same year the Obama Administration used the 2002 AUMF
against Iraq in secondary-conjunction with the 2001 AUMF to authorize a resurgence of
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U.S. ground forces to Iraq in yet another instance of presidential expansionism of the war
on terror (Brandon-Smith).
In the Summer of 2014, the Obama Administration began increasing deployments
of U.S. forces to Iraq to fight against a new enemy, the Islamic State (IS), stating that
such action was "consistent with" the War Powers Resolution and his constitutional
authority (Weed, Pres. References 28). After the initial destruction of al-Qaeda in the
latter stages of the Iraq War, the Islamic State descended from al-Qaeda's ashes as an
"associated force" following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 (Bradley
637). The Obama Administration concluded that the 2001 AUMF authorized hostilities
against the Islamic State because the group had a "direct relationship" with al-Qaeda's
leader, Osama Bin Laden, and while he was alive had waged conflict "in allegiance to
him" against the United States (Bradley 637). By 2014 however, the Islamic State had
disassociated itself from al-Qaeda and began competing with the group for power
throughout the globe (Bradley 637).
In August of 2014, Obama informed Congress of the initiation of "limited
airstrikes" against Islamic State targets, by again referencing the reporting requirements
of the WPR but had yet to cite any supporting authorization through the 2001 AUMF or
the 2002 AUMF. The following month, President Obama addressed the Nation on
September 10th, 2014, discussing his intent to further engage the Islamic State through a
"long-term series of airstrikes, new deployments, and other military actions" (Weed, Pres.
References 28). On September 23rd, 2014, the Obama Administration reported to
Congress regarding the ongoing campaign against the Islamic State in Iraq (Weed, Pres.
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References 28). Within both of the President's September notifications to Congress,
Obama again cited the WPR's reporting requirements and stated that such actions were
pursuant to his constitutional authority and the 2001 AUMF (Weed, Pres. References 28).
While not explicitly citing the 2002 AUMF against Iraq within these notifications, the
Administration continued to rely on the 2002 AUMF as a source of secondary-authority
for the President to conduct anti-Islamic State operations in Iraq, despite previously
advocating for its repeal (Ramsey 17-18). Despite being formed well after the terrorist
attacks of September 11th, 2001, Obama relied on the 2001 AUMF as the proper
authority to engage the Islamic State as an "associated force" of al-Qaeda in Iraq
throughout his presidency (Brandon-Smith).
An assessment into Barack Obama's expansion of presidential war powers would
not be complete without detailing his extensive use of remote drone warfare during his
presidency. In 2000, the United States drone program began to be developed and refined
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Afghanistan (Sifton). These early drone
operations were conducted using unarmed drones for the purpose of intelligence
gathering operations on Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda (Sifton). Shortly following the
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the CIA began arming
drones to seek and destroy Bin Laden and al-Qaeda associated targets through precision
airstrikes (Sifton). Under the direction of Obama's predecessor George W. Bush, the
United States expanded armed drone operations outside of Afghanistan and conducted
fifty drone airstrikes against al-Qaeda "associated" persons and organizations in Pakistan,
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Yemen, and Somalia, killing an estimated 296 terrorists and 195 civilians in the process
(Zenko, Obama's Embrace).
Upon assuming the presidency in 2009, Obama began to vastly expand W. Bush's
use of drones for counterterrorism operations under the 2001 AUMF by ordering his first
two strikes just three days following his inauguration (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data).
Throughout his two terms in office, President Obama ordered approximately fivehundred, and forty drone strikes principally in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, killing an
"estimated 3,797 people, including 324 civilians" (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data). Just as
he had done in Iraq with the Islamic State, many of Obama's drone strikes in Yemen and
Somalia were authorized against "associated" groups or persons of al-Qaeda formed well
after the enactment of the 2001 AUMF (Ramsey 13-14). For instance, many of Obama's
drone strikes in Yemen were directed at al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
which formed in 2009 out of a union of prior al-Qaeda affiliates within the region
(Ramsey 14). In Somalia, Obama namely targeted persons with ties to al-Qaeda within
the militant group al-Shabab, which was formed in 2004 but pledged allegiance to alQaeda in 2012 (Ramsey 14).
Aside from the massive destruction President Obama left in his wake, perhaps the
most notable impact of his presidency regarding war powers were the efforts undertaken
by his Administration to institutionalize and normalize the use of drone warfare (Zenko,
Obama's Embrace). Indeed, the Obama Administration did not believe these strikes took
place in the context of "war" and were therefore out of the reach of Congress. Unlike his
predecessor, Obama took unprecedented action by acknowledging the use of covert drone
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strikes in non-battlefield settings in 2011 (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). Shortly after, the
Obama Administration began carefully scripting language and scrupulously crafting
policy framework regarding the presidential usage of drones and lethal counterterrorism
operations in "conventional war zones" and "areas outside active hostilities" (Tankel et
al.). In the 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG), Obama codified the legal
"Procedures for Approving Direct Action Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities" (Tankel et al.). According to Obama's 2013 PPG, before conducting lethal
operations in areas outside of active hostilities, the president would need to provide an
operational plan including a counterterrorism objective and a given duration for the use
of force, a legal basis for doing so and approval from a high-ranking White House official
(Tankel et al.). Obama's PPG required strict conditions to be met, including a suspected
imminent threat towards U.S. persons posed by the target and the consent of the host
nation (Tankel et al.). If the host nation did not consent to the operation, the president
would still be enabled to conduct the operation in the absence of other alternatives
through "near certainty" that the approved target would be present, provided that civilians
would not be harmed (Tankel et al.). Once authorization was granted under the PPG,
"signature strikes" against unidentified terrorist suspects could be conducted freely as
well, so long as U.S. citizens were not involved (Tankel et al.).
In May of 2013, Obama announced to Congress and the American public that his
Administration had formalized such reforms trough the PPG, but there is little evidence
that supports this assertion (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). For instance, according to the
Obama Administration, such reforms did not apply to drone operations in Pakistan post96

PPG, "where roughly 40 percent of all non-battlefield drone strikes (…)
occurred" (Zenko, Obama's Embrace). Additionally, while Obama left his policies
regarding drone warfare in ill-effect during the latter half of his presidency, he received
no meaningful opposition from Congress, who overwhelmingly supported the President's
expropriation of their war powers through his actions (Zenko, Obama's Drone Data).
While Congress did not meaningfully oppose the President's covert usage of drone
strikes, sects of the American public and the international community began to pressure
the Obama Administration to publicly acknowledge the lethal consequences of his drone
strikes (McKelvey). Amid mounting pressure to publicly adhere to his policies on the
release of drone strike data, President Obama signed an executive order in July of 2016,
which mandated the Director of the CIA to release annual reports regarding the usage of
drones in lethal operations, including the total number of civilians killed (National
Archives and Records Administration). As a result of Obama's tenure, extensive usage of
unilaterally-ordered drone strikes are now normalized and cemented within the war
powers of the presidency and in the eyes of the American public, despite international
opposition to the practice (Zenko, Obama's Embrace).
In addition to the drone strikes used by the Obama Administration, Obama
ordered vast amounts of remote tomahawk cruise-missile and airstrikes against not only
the "associated forces" of al-Qaeda but other terrorist and rebel organizations in Yemen
and Libya throughout his time in office. In October of 2016, President Obama authorized
the U.S. Navy to target positions held by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen with
tomahawk cruise-missile strikes without congressional authorization (Ramsey 13-14).
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While the Houthi group had no connection to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, the group had
previously attacked U.S. Navy vessels in the region (Ramsey 13-14). In the absence of
congressional approval, Obama was nonetheless justified to exercise his constitutional
authority in this case, as he was responding to an attack on U.S. forces (Ramsey 13-14).
While he was within his constitutional authority to order unilateral military action in
Yemen, such was not the case in his Libya campaign. Despite considerable pushback
from Congress following his intervention into the Libyan Civil War under supposed U.N.
authority in 2011, Obama continued to order U.S. military action in Libya throughout his
presidency— chiefly against anti-U.N. groups and the Islamic State (Bergen et al.). In the
summer of 2016, Obama declared an area of Libya to be an area of active hostilities
under the 2013 PPG to continue direct strikes against Islamic State militants in the
country (Tankel et al.).
When Donald J. Trump was inaugurated in January of 2017, he inherited not only
an empowered presidency but also a massive United States-led global campaign against
terror. Like Obama, Trump campaigned on a platform to reduce U.S. intervention in
"endless" foreign wars and vowed to bring American troops home from the Middle East
and Afghanistan (Dreazen). While he claimed to want to reduce U.S. intervention in
foreign wars, Trump also campaigned on decimating terrorist organizations such as alQaeda and the Islamic State in the global war on terror (Tankel et al.). As a candidate,
Trump's strategy for destroying the Islamic State was to "bomb the shit out of 'em," and
argued that the United States would also "have to take out their families" to wage
successful counterterrorism operations (Tankel et al.). Since assuming the presidency,
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Trump has expanded U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda and their "associated
forces," as well as Islamic State (Tankel et al.). In doing so, Trump has relied on the
Obama Administration's expansive interpretation of prior congressional authorizations to
continue waging—and in some cases— expanding United States military operations in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, and Iraq. Aside from ongoing efforts, the
Trump Administration expanded U.S. combat operations to Syria against the Islamic
State and al-Assad forces, while threatening to unilaterally order military action towards
North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela.
The Trump Administration continues anti-Islamic State combat operations under
the Obama Administration's interpretation of the 2001 AUMF. While Obama relied on the
2002 AUMF as mostly an "alternative statutory basis" to the 2001 AUMF for
counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, Trump has taken this
interpretation further by asserting that the 2002 AUMF also addresses "threats to, or
stemming from, Iraq" in "Syria or elsewhere" from IS operations (Brandon-Smith).
Perhaps more controversially, however, in 2017, Trump unilaterally extended U.S. directcombat operations in Syria outside of the Islamic State threat and towards the regime of
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (Arkin et al.). In retaliation for a supposed chemical
attack on Syrian civilians by al-Assad forces, President Trump ordered fifty-nine
Tomahawk cruise-missile strikes against various Syrian air defense and infrastructure
targets on April 6th, 2017 (Arkin et al.). Following the initial strike of al-Assad forces, in
January of 2018, the Trump Administration announced that it would continue to fight
against the Islamic State and al-Assad (which had received material support from the
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Russian and Iranian governments) through an "open-ended military presence" in the
Syrian Civil War (Borger et al.). In December 2018, however, Trump ordered the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria and declared victory over IS forces in the
country (Landler et al.). Nonetheless, on November 23rd, 2019, the head of the U.S.
Central Command announced there would be no imminent "end date" of U.S.
involvement in Syria (Seligman). According to the Trump Administration, a small U.S.
military "contingency" force continues to remain in the country to prevent a resurgence of
the Islamic State in Syria and to negate any advances by Iran or Russia in the region
towards the interests of the United States (Seligman).
Using the broad interpretation of the 2001 AUMF catalyzed through previous
administrations, the Trump Administration continues U.S. counterterrorism combat
operations outside of Iraq and Syria in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya
to the present day. The War in Afghanistan, now the longest-running war in American
history, continues to be raged under the authority of the 2001 AUMF. Trump has
continued to build upon the air and drone strike campaigns of his predecessors against
“associated forces” of al-Qaeda in Pakistan (Table 4), Libya (Bergen et al.), Yemen, and
Somalia (Table 5) under the authority supposedly granted by the 2001 AUMF.
Additionally, the Trump Administration has been less transparent regarding the use of
drones and the lethality of such. In March of 2019, President Trump revoked Obama’s
2016 Executive Order, which required the CIA Director to release annual summaries of
U.S. drone strikes and related-casualties, as the Trump Administration considered it
“superfluous” and distracting (McKelvey). As a result, the presidency is essentially once
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Table 4: Total U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan (June 19, 2004 through March 30,
2020)
Administration

Total Number of Drone Strikes in Pakistan

George W. Bush

48

Barack Obama

353

Donald J. Trump

13

Total

414

Source(s): Bergen, Peter, et al. “America's Counterterrorism Wars (Data on Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and
Libya).” New America, New America, 30 Mar. 2020.

Table 5: Total U.S. Air and Drone Strikes in Yemen and Somalia from George W.
Bush through Donald J. Trump (as of March 30, 2020)
Administration

Total Number of Drone of Air
Strikes in
Yemen

Total Number of Drone or Air
Strikes in Somalia

George W. Bush

1

7

Barack Obama

182

43

Donald J. Trump

101 (Insufficient Detail)

176

Total

284

226

Source(s): Bergen, Peter, et al. “America's Counterterrorism Wars (Data on Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and
Libya).” New America, New America, 30 Mar. 2020.

again enabled to conduct lethal drone operations covertly, thus leaving the actual number
of drone strikes and their results classified under the Trump Administration.
In addition to Trump’s revoke of Obama’s 2016 Executive Order on drone strike
transparency, the Trump Administration has also taken additional action, which has
enabled an increase in drone strikes and troop deployments both inside and outside of
traditional war zones. In late 2017, the Trump Administration replaced Obama’s PPG
guidelines for conducting direct operations outside of traditional war zones with his own
framework, known as “Principles, Standards, and Procedures” (PPS) (Tankel et al.).
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Under Trump’s PPS, the U.S. may now target suspected terrorists outside of traditional
war zones even if they do not pose a “continuing, imminent threat” towards U.S. persons
(Tankel et al.). While it is clear that such action increases the number of persons the U.S.
may target, the Trump Administration has not yet provided information as to the current
standard for counterterrorism military actions in non-traditional war zones (Tankel et al.).
Additionally, while the approval of higher-ranking White House officials is still required
to begin operations in a new country, proposed drone strikes no longer have to be
subjected to the same scrutiny as the 2013 PPG (Tankel et al.). Instead, the Trump
Administration has delegated the approval process to those of “lower levels of seniority”
under the current policy guidelines (Tankel et al.). As a result of President Trump’s
changes to the standards governing direct military action, the U.S. is now enabled to
conduct more drone strikes and counterterrorism operations than under the previous
administration. For instance, between 2016 and 2017, there was a notable increase in
drone strikes against targets in Yemen and Somalia (Tankel et al.). While Trump has
eased the standards for direct action outside of areas of active hostilities, he has also
relaxed the rules of engagement within traditional war zones (Tankel et al.). Trump has
also delegated the presidential authority of controlling the deployment of U.S. forces to
the Pentagon (Tankel et al.). As a consequence of Trump’s actions, deployments of U.S.
special operations forces have increased globally, and operations have been conducted
more aggressively as opposed to the previous (Tankel et al.).
While Trump has continued to expand military operations seemingly unopposed,
there have seldom been instances of congressional pushback. In early 2019, Congress
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passed S.J.Res.7 in an attempt to remove U.S. forces engaged in “hostilities” in Yemen
(Anderson). The joint resolution, which was grounded in the requirements of the War
Powers Resolution, directed “the President to remove [U.S. armed forces] from hostilities
in or affecting the Republic of Yemen,” except those targeting al-Qaeda, within 30 days,
“unless and until a declaration of war or specific authorization for such use . . . has been
enacted” (Anderson). Further, the joint resolution defined “hostilities” in which U.S.
forces were engaged in as “in-flight refueling of non-[U.S.] aircraft conducting missions
as part of the ongoing civil war in Yemen” (Anderson). Despite congressional efforts to
remove U.S. forces from such “hostilities” in Yemen, President Trump informed
Congress that he was vetoing the measure on April 16th, 2019 (Anderson). Within his
veto statement to Congress, Trump stated that such U.S. military operations in Yemen
were crucial to defending “the safety of the more than 80,000 Americans who reside in
certain coalition countries” who have been subjected to attacks stemming from Yemen
(Anderson). In accordance with presidential tradition, Trump also iterated that actions to
“prohibit certain tactical operations, such as in-flight refueling, or require military
engagements to adhere to arbitrary timelines” were “dangerous,” as they would “interfere
with the President’s constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces” (Anderson). Following Trump’s veto of S.J.Res.7, the United States has
continued to conduct military operations in Yemen (Bergen et al.).
As Trump has expanded U.S. forces and combat operations against terror and into
foreign wars in a manner reflective of previous administrations, he has asserted an
unprecedented amount of unilateral authority to order military action against numerous
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foreign nations. Through both “tweets” on the social media platform Twitter and
traditional venues of presidential address, Trump has threatened to order unilateral U.S.
military action against Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran since assuming the presidency
in 2017. Here are five such examples:
1. On August 11th, 2017, President Trump threatened to unilaterally commit U.S. forces
into hostilities in Venezuela against the socialist regime of president Nicholás
Maduro, stating that “We [the Trump Administration] have many options for
Venezuela including a possible military option if necessary,” as “Venezuela is not
very far away and the people are suffering and dying” (Jacobs).
2. In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly on September 19th, 2017,
President Trump announced that if forced to defend itself, the “United States would
totally destroy North Korea” in response (Hamedy).
3. In January of 2018, amid reports of ongoing North Korean nuclear weapons testing
and other intimidations towards the United States and U.S. allies in the region, the
President tweeted:
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un just stated that the “Nuclear Button is on his
desk at all times.” Will someone from his depleted and food starved regime
please inform him that I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger &
more powerful one than his, and my Button works! (Beckwith)
4. Following the U.S. strike in Baghdad, Iraq which killed Iranian General Qassem
Soleimani on January 3rd, 2020, President Trump issued a warning against any
Iranian retaliatory action in response on January 5th, 2020. Within his warning,
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Trump also asserted that his tweets serve as “notification” to Congress regarding the
initiation of U.S. military action:
These Media Posts will serve as notification to the United States Congress that
should Iran strike any U.S. person or target, the United States will quickly &
fully strike back, & perhaps in a disproportionate manner. Such legal notice is not
required, but is given nevertheless! (Snow and Leo)
As an indicator of the changing nature of politics and the larger debate regarding
constitutional war powers, the House Foreign Affairs Committee replied to the
President’s assertion of due “notification” to Congress the same day, by crafting a tweet
of their own: “This Media Post will serve as a reminder that war powers reside in the
Congress under the United States Constitution. And that you should read the War Powers
Act [the War Powers Resolution]. And that you’re not a dictator.” (Snow and Leo).
5. While tensions continued to escalate with Iran following the U.S. killing of Iranian
General Qassem Soleimani, Trump further threatened Iran with military action on
April 1st, 2020, tweeting “Upon information and belief, Iran or its proxies are
planning a sneak attack on U.S. troops and/or assets in Iraq. If this happens, Iran will
pay a very heavy price, indeed!” (Jackson and Brook).
Since assuming the office, Trump’s tweets regarding threats of military force are now
treated as “official statements” from the White House and threats to unilaterally order
U.S. military force abroad have been a reoccurring theme throughout Trump’s tenure
(Beckwith). While these threats to use force are seemingly unprecedented, they are not
solely a product of President Trump. Rather, these statements illustrate how far
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presidential actions and assertions of presidential war powers have deviated from the
actual institutional balance prescribed by the Founders in the Constitution.
As demonstrated throughout this section, Presidents George W. Bush, Barack
Obama, and Donald J. Trump continued to build upon the expansive assertions of
presidential war powers as established and developed since 1942. During this period,
Presidents either relied upon on broad interpretations of existing congressional
authorizations, expansive assertions of constitutional authority, U.N. resolutions, or
support from NATO allies to unilaterally force the Nation’s military forces into hostilities
and conflict. As was the case from 1942-2001, during the twenty-first century, Congress
did not meaningfully challenge the presidential expropriation of their constitutionallygranted war powers. Rather, Congress catalyzed the practice and the global war on terror,
by enabling the president to assert dominating authority over the Nation’s war powers
through previous precedent, the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and by failing to meaningfully
oppose these actions through legal and political checks.
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Conclusion
On January 3rd, 2020, President Trump unilaterally ordered a drone strike, which
killed Iranian major general Qassem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport in
Iraq (Helsel et al.). To justify the unilateral order, the Trump Administration has relied on
the President's inherent Article II powers as commander in chief, the 2002 AUMF against
Iraq, and as a "matter of national self-defense" under the United Nations Charter
(Goodman and Vladeck, Setzler). Despite claims from the executive branch that the
President took "decisive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad" meant to "stop a war,"
Trump's actions were not met with the same enamor in Congress (Helsel et al. and White
House). Following Soleimani's demise, a bipartisan coalition in Congress sharply
rebuked President Trump's justification for his unilateral order against Iran grounded in
the 2002 AUMF (Carney). These contrasting interpretations of Trump's drone strike
spawned the scope of this study: When authoring the Constitution, what did the Founding
Fathers intend the legislative and executive branches to do in the context of war, and how
have these branches adhered to the Founders' original intent concerning war powers
throughout American history? In this final development, we will consider President
Trump's justification and congressional claims of unauthorized military action in light of
the Founders' intentions and historical practice of the Nation's war powers.
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Through their experiences under British rule, the Founders were well aware of
how tyranny could extend from a unitary executive empowered with unilateral warmaking capabilities. As such, when crafting the Constitution, the Founders instituted a
system of checks and balances to ensure the Nation would not subject to war without
congressional authorization. Within Article I, Section 8, the Founders vested numerous
war powers to the legislative branch, including the power to declaring war, to raising and
support armies, provide and maintain a navy and calling forth the militia to Congress.
Once Congress did authorize military action, the Founders empowered the president with
considerable latitude in executing such actions as commander in chief under his Article II
authority. Except for repelling attacks against the United States, the Founders never
intended the president to be enabled to act unilaterally by ordering military action in the
absence of congressional authorization.
From 1789-1942, this institutional balance was—for the most part— adhered to
by America's leadership. The presidential tradition of expropriating war powers from
Congress was initiated by Franklin D. Roosevelt and catapulted by Harry Truman
through his interventionist doctrine against the spread of communism in the Cold War.
Following Truman's unilateral deployment of U.S. forces into the Korean War under the
supposed auspice of international authority, presidents have since claimed similar wideranging assertions in war-making. Following decades of presidential expansionism, it
took a vastly unpopular war in Vietnam, and in particular, Nixon's invasion of Cambodia
in 1970, for Congress to attempt to reassert their constitutional war powers through the
War Powers Resolution.
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While the War Powers Resolution intends to reestablish the institutional balance
of the Nation's war powers as prescribed by the Founders, it has failed to do so for a
variety of reasons. In comparison with the Constitution, the WPR grants the president far
greater unilateral authority in war-making by allowing the president to deploy American
military forces abroad without congressional authorization for up to ninety days. To
check this ability, under the WPR, Congress was initially permitted to end any U.S.
military involvement abroad by a simple majority-vote by concurrent resolution.
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chadha, however, Congress now requires a
veto-proof majority to end presidential military action. Additionally, since its enactment
in 1973, presidents have treated the WPR as an unconstitutional and a non-binding
encroachment on their own constitutional authorities. When presidents have cited the War
Powers Resolution in their reports to Congress regarding military action, they have done
so as consistent with, rather than in pursuance of the WPR. From Nixon forward,
presidents have either ignored the WPR or used it as a blank check to introduce U.S.
forces abroad for up to ninety days without congressional approval. Additionally, in the
past, three presidents have narrowed the definition of military action, which requires
congressional authorization. For instance, when Obama unilaterally committed U.S.
forces into the Libyan Civil War in 2011, his administration argued that such actions did
not constitute war or hostilities under the WPR and thus were permitted through the
president's constitutional authorities without congressional authorization.
Simultaneously, Congress has permitted the expansion of presidential war-making
by allowing presidents to interpret existing and outdated authorizations of military force
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broadly. Unlike the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which thrust the United States into the
Vietnam War, Congress has failed to repeal various authorizations to use military force,
which has enabled the presidency to continuously entrench and expand U.S. forces
abroad in endless foreign military contests. While the 2001 AUMF was intended to be
tailored toward authorizing military force against al-Qaeda and the Taliban—the
perpetrators of the September 11th, 2001 terror attacks against the United States— it has
been used by the presidency as a broad justification to use force against actors which did
not even exist at the time, such as IS and AQAP. Since its enactment in 2001, the AUMF
against terror has been cited as a statutory basis for U.S. military operations in "at least
19 different countries, including seven of which that are ongoing" (Kosar). Perhaps the
most notable ongoing operation under 2001 AUMF authority, the War in Afghanistan, is
now the longest-running war in American history and continues to be raged with
inconclusive results at the expense of American life and resources. Meanwhile, the 2002
AUMF against Iraq continues to be cited as a justification for the presidency to order
further military action in Iraq and Syria, despite it being tailored to fight against Saddam
Hussein's Iraqi regime in 2002. As U.S. and coalition forces toppled Hussein's
government in 2003, just as the 2001 AUMF, the 2002 AUMF has long outlived its
enacted purpose.
By using the 2002 AUMF to justify military action against Iran, the Trump
Administration has underscored this notion. As the title of the AUMF makes clear, the
authorization of military force is "against Iraq," not Iran (Goodman and Vladeck). Within
its stated purpose, the 2002 AUMF authorizes the president to use military force in order
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to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq," and to enforce relevant U.N. resolutions "regarding Iraq" (Goodman and
Vladeck). As such, in ordering the attack that killed Soleimani, the Trump Administration
is not relying on relevant statutory authority, national self-defense under the United
Nations, or the Constitution. Instead, the Trump Administration is relying on the broad
war powers assertions of the modern presidency, enabled through appeasement, and a
lack of meaningful opposition from Congress. Trump, like his processors, knows that
Congress is unlikely to mount a unified effort, which would hamper his ability to wield
the Nation's military forces unilaterally.
As it stands, the modern American president asserts his dominance over war
powers in a manner more reflective of the British monarch versus that of the Founders'
intentions. Fortunately, there is a solution— the Constitution. In order for the Nation's
war powers to be returned to its original balance, Congress must take a meaningful and
unified stance to reassert its rightful powers over war using its constitutional checks on
the executive branch. If not, the presidency is likely to continue its present tradition of
asserting a unilateral dominance over the Nation's military and further thrust the United
States into perpetual conflict abroad.

111

Introduction Works Cited
Carney, Jordain. “Rand Paul, Mike Lee Rip Administration over 'Insulting and
Demeaning' Iran Briefing.” TheHill, The Hill, 8 Jan. 2020, thehill.com/
homenews/senate/477424-rand-paul-mike-lee-rip-administration-over-insultingand-demeaning-iran.
Helsel, Phil, et al. “U.S. Airstrike Kills Top Iran General, Qassem Soleimani, at Baghdad
Airport.” NBC News, NBC Universal News Group, 4 Jan. 2020,
www.nbcnews.com/news/world/airstrike-kills-top-iran-general-qassim-suleimanibaghdad-airport-iraqi-n1109821.
Macias, Amanda, et al. “Iran Fires Missiles at Multiple Bases Housing US Troops in
Iraq.” CNBC, CNBC, 8 Jan. 2020, www.cnbc.com/2020/01/07/iran-state-tv-saystehran-has-launched-missiles-at-iraqs-air-base-housing-us-troops.html.
“Remarks by President Trump on the Killing of Qasem Soleimani.” The White House,
The United States Government, 3 Jan. 2020, www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-killing-qasem-soleimani/.
Santucci, Jeanine. “Republicans Stand with Trump after Iran Remarks While Democrats
Blame Tensions on Soleimani Killing.” USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information
Network, 9 Jan. 2020, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/01/08/irandemocrats-republicans-react-trump-address-missile-attack/2844647001/.
Segers, Grace. “House Approves War Powers Resolution to Restrict Trump on Iran.” CBS
News, CBS Interactive, 10 Jan. 2020, www.cbsnews.com/news/war-powersresolution-house-votes-to-limit-trumps-ability-act-against-iran/.
112

“Text - H.Con.Res.83 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Directing the President Pursuant to
Section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution to Terminate the Use of United States
Armed Forces to Engage in Hostilities in or against Iran.” Congress.gov, 13 Jan.
2020, www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/83/text.

113

Chapter I Works Cited
“Alexander Hamilton: Documents Decoded.” Alexander Hamilton: Documents Decoded,
by Christina G. Villegas, ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2018, pp. 66–67.
“The Articles of Confederation.” History, Art & Archives, US House of Representatives: ,
history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1700s/The-Articles-of-Confederation/.
Blackburn, Robert. “Britain's Unwritten Constitution.” The British Library, The British
Library, 9 Feb. 2015, www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwrittenconstitution.
“Blackstone's Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of
the Federal Government of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.” Wythepedia: The George Wythe Encyclopedia, William and Mary,
lawlibrary.wm.edu/wythepedia/index.php/Blackstone%27s_Commentaries.
Chandler, Ralph Clark. “PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION UNDER THE ARTICLE OF
CONFEDERATION.” Public Administration Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4, 1990, pp.
433–450. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40862257. Accessed 4 May 2020.
“The Constitution of New York : April 20, 1777.” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School:
Lillian Goldman Law Library, avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp.
Continental Congress and Constitutional Convention. Library of Congress,
www.loc.gov/static/collections/continental-congress-and-constitutionalconvention-from-1774-to-1789/articles-and-essays/to-form-a-more-perfect-union/
creating-a-constitution.html.

114

Currie, David P. “Rumors of Wars: Presidential and Congressional War Powers,
1809-1829.” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 67, no. 1, 2000, pp. 1–
40. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1600325. Accessed 1 May 2020.
“The Debate Over the President and the Executive Branch.” Center for the Study of the
American Constitution, University of Wisconsin-Madison, csac.history.wisc.edu/
document-collections/constitutional-debates/executive-branch/.
“The Declaration of Independence and Natural Rights.” Constitutional Rights
Foundation, Constitutional Rights Foundation, www.crf-usa.org/foundations-ofour-constitution/natural-rights.html.
“The Federalist Papers.” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School: Lillian Goldman Law
Library, avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed26.asp.
“The First American Constitutions Republican Ideology and the Making of the State
Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era.” The First American Constitutions
Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the
Revolutionary Era, by Willi Paul Adams et al., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2001, pp. 290–290.
“George Clinton.” Edited by The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 22 July 2019, www.britannica.com/
biography/George-Clinton-vice-president-of-United-States.
“Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau on Government.” Constitutional Rights
Foundation, Constitutional Rights Foundation, www.crf-usa.org/bill-of-rights-inaction/bria-20-2-c-hobbes-locke-montesquieu-and-rousseau-on-government.html.
115

Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. Edited by William Peden. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and
Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1954.
John, Locke. “Two Treatises of Government CHAP. XIV. Of Prerogative.” John Locke,
“On Prerogative Power,” University of Colorado, www.colorado.edu/herbst/sites/
default/files/attached-files/nov_9_-_presidency.pdf.
“Madison Debates, August 17, 1787.” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School: Lillian
Goldman Law Library, avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_817.asp.
“Modern History Sourcebook: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws, 1748.” Internet
History Sourcebooks, Fordham University, sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/
montesquieu-spirit.asp.
Morey, William C. “The First State Constitutions.” The Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science, vol. 4, 1893, pp. 1–32. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/
stable/1009012. Accessed 4 Apr. 2020.
Sevi, Michael. “Original Intent, Timetables, and Iraq: The Founders’ Views on War
Powers.” Texas Review of Law and Politics, vol. 13, no. 1, Fall 2008, p. 73-104.
HeinOnline.
“The Presidency and Political Science: Paradigms of Presidential Power from the
Founding to the Present.” The Presidency and Political Science: Paradigms of
Presidential Power from the Founding to the Present, by Raymond Tatalovich et
al., M.E. Sharpe, 2014, pp. 89–90.

116

“Thomas Jefferson, a Brief Biography.” Monticello, www.monticello.org/thomasjefferson/brief-biography-of-jefferson/.
Tuckness, Alex. “Locke's Political Philosophy.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
Stanford University, 11 Jan. 2016, plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke-political/
#SepPowDisGov.
“U.S. Constitution.” Legal Information Institute , Cornell Law School,
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.
USA-project. “First Draft of the Constitution (August 6).” Department of AlfaInformatica, University of Groningen, www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/
the-anti-federalist-papers/first-draft-of-the-constitution-(august-6).php.
“War Powers.” Lawfare, Lawfare and Brookings Institute, 31 Oct. 2019,
www.lawfareblog.com/war-powers.
Yazawa, Melvin. “Contested Conventions: The Struggle to Establish the Constitution and
Save the Union, 1787–1789.” Google Books, JHU Press, 15 Aug. 2016,
books.google.com/books/about/Contested_Conventions.html?
id=MIqfDAAAQBAJ.

117

Chapter II Works Cited
“An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and
the Dependencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their
Territories.” Avalon Project - Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, Yale
Law School: Lillian Goldman Law Library, avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
1812-01.asp.
“April 15, 1861: President Lincoln Calls Congress into Emergency Session.” The Civil
War: The Senate's Story, United States Senate, 22 Jan. 2020, www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/civil_war/
LincolnEmergencySession_FeaturedDoc.htm.
“Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).” Justia Law U.S. Supreme Court, Justia,
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/4/37/.
“Close Act of April 25, 1898, Public Law 55-69, 30 STAT 364, Which Declared War
between the United States and Spain.” National Archives and Records
Administration, National Archives and Records Administration,
catalog.archives.gov/id/299824.
Dueholm, James A. “Lincoln's Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: An Historical
and Constitutional Analysis.” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association,
Michigan Publishing, University of Michigan Library, 2008, quod.lib.umich.edu/
j/jala/2629860.0029.205/--lincoln-s-suspension-of-the-writ-of-habeas-corpus?
rgn=main%3Bview.

118

Elsea, Jennifer K., and Matthew C. Weed. “Declarations of War and Authorizations for
the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.”
Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 2014.
“February 16 1898: Battleship U.S.S. Maine Explodes.” PBS, Public Broadcasting
Service, 1999, www.pbs.org/crucible/tl10.html.
Fisher, Louis. "The Mexican War and Lincoln’s “Spot Resolutions”." The Law Library of
Congress, http://loufisher.org/docs/wi/433. pdf. 2009.
“Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).” Justia Law U.S. Supreme Court,
Justia, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/323/214/.
Lindsay, James M. “TWE Remembers: A War ‘Unnecessarily and Unconstitutionally’
Begun.” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 3 Jan.
2011, www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-war-unnecessarily-andunconstitutionally-begun.
“Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).” Justia Law U.S. Supreme Court, Justia,
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/137/.
“Official Declarations of War by Congress.” United States Senate, United States Senate
Office, 10 Apr. 2019, www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm.
"Prize Cases." Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1850-1900/67us635. Accessed 10 Apr. 2020.
Ramsey, Michael D. “Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency.”
American Journal of International Law, vol. 110, no. 4, Aug. 2016, pp. 701–717.,
doi:10.1017/s0002930000763184.
119

“Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. 1 (1801).” Justia Law U.S. Supreme Court, Justia,
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/5/1/.
“The Blockade of Confederate Ports, 1861–1865.” U.S. Department of State Office of the
Historian, U.S. Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/
blockade.
“The Declaration of War.” The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict, by DONALD R.
HICKEY, University of Illinois Press, 2012, pp. 28–47. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/
stable/10.5406/j.ctt3fh41c.8. Accessed 8 Apr. 2020.
The Writings of James Madison. Edited by Gaillard Hunt. 9 vols. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1900--1910. See also: Federalist
“U.S. Constitution.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School,
www.law.cornell.edu/constitution.
“United States Declaration of War with Mexico (1846).” Statutes at Large, Library of
Congress, www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/29th-congress/session-1/
c29s1ch16.pdf.
Wallenfeldt, Jeff. “Texas Revolution.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., 15 Dec. 2017, www.britannica.com/topic/Texas-Revolution.
Waxman, Matthew. “The Mexican-American War and Constitutional War Powers.”
Lawfare, Lawfare and Brookings Institute, 5 Feb. 2020, www.lawfareblog.com/
mexican-american-war-and-constitutional-war-powers.

120

Chapter III Works Cited
Adler, David Gray. “‘The Law’: The Clinton Theory of the War Power.” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 1, 2000, pp. 155–168. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/
stable/27552075. Accessed 20 Apr. 2020.
Anderson, Scott R. “Where Trump's Veto Leaves the Yemen Resolution.” Brookings,
Brookings, 18 Apr. 2019, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/18/
where-trumps-veto-leaves-the-yemen-resolution/.
Arkin, Daniel, et al. “Trump Announces Strikes on Syria Following Suspected Chemical
Weapons Attack by Assad Forces.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group,
14 Dec. 2018, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/trump-announces-strikes-syriafollowing-suspected-chemical-weapons-attack-assad-n865966.
Bash, Dana. ”White House pressed on 'mission accomplished' sign". CNN. Cable News
Network. October 27, 2003. Archived from the original on July 15, 2006.
Retrieved April 23, 2020.
Beckwith, Ryan T. “Donald Trump's Nuke Button Tweet Raises Concerns, Again.” Time,
Time, 3 Jan. 2018, time.com/5085979/donald-trump-nuke-button-nuclear-northkorea/.
Benjamin, Medea, and Leonardo Flores. “Threatening Military Intervention in Venezuela
During a Pandemic?” Common Dreams, Common Dreams, 15 Apr. 2020,
www.commondreams.org/views/2020/04/15/threatening-military-interventionvenezuela-during-pandemic.

121

Bergen, Peter, et al. “America's Counterterrorism Wars (Data on Pakistan, Yemen,
Somalia and Libya).” New America, New America, 30 Mar. 2020,
www.newamerica.org/international-security/reports/americas-counterterrorismwars/.
Borger, Julian, et al. “US Military to Maintain Open-Ended Presence in Syria, Tillerson
Says.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 17 Jan. 2018,
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jan/17/us-military-syria-isis-iran-assadtillerson.
Brandon-Smith, Heather. “The 2002 Iraq AUMF: What It Is and Why Congress Should
Repeal It.” Friends Committee on National Legislation, FCNL, 3 July 2019,
www.fcnl.org/updates/the-2002-iraq-aumf-what-it-is-and-why-congress-shouldrepeal-it-2194.
“Bill Clinton and America’s Credibility after the Cold War.” Who Fights for Reputation:
The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict, by Keren Yarhi-Milo,
Princeton University Press, PRINCETON; OXFORD, 2018, pp. 223–264. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/ stable/j.ctv69th2b.12. Accessed 21 Apr. 2020.
Burgin, Eileen. “Congress, the War Powers Resolution, & the Invasion of Panama.”
Polity, vol. 25, no. 2, 1992, pp. 217–242. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3235109.
Accessed 19 Apr. 2020
Carter, Stephen L. “The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” Virginia Law
Review, vol. 70, no. 1, 1984, p. 101., doi:10.2307/1072825.

122

Curtis A. Bradley, and Jack L. Goldsmith. “Obama's AUMF Legacy.” The American
Journal of International Law, vol. 110, no. 4, 2016, pp. 628–645. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.4.0628. Accessed 23 Apr. 2020.
Damrosch, Lori Fisler. “The Clinton Administration and War Powers.” Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 63, no. 1/2, 2000, pp. 125–141. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/1192445. Accessed 21 Apr. 2020.
“DEFENSIVE WAR: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Cambodian Incursion.” War Powers:
The Politics of Constitutional Authority, by Mariah Zeisberg, Princeton University
Press, Princeton; Oxford, 2013, pp. 146–183. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/
j.ctt2854xj.6. Accessed 18 Apr. 2020.
Dreazen, Yochi. “Candidate Trump Promised to Stay out of Foreign Wars. President
Trump Is Escalating Them.” Vox, Vox, 25 Aug. 2017, www.vox.com/world/
2017/8/25/16185936/trump-america-first-afghanistan-war-troops-iraq-generals.
Elsea, Jennifer K., and Matthew C. Weed. “Declarations of War and Authorizations for
the Use of Military Force: Historical Background and Legal Implications.”
Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, 2014.
“Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).” Justia Law U.S. Supreme Court, Justia,
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/317/1/.
“Executive Order 9066: The President Authorizes Japanese Relocation.” History Matters,
George Mason University, 18 Mar. 2018, historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5154.

123

“Executive Order -- United States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address
Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving the Use of Force.” National
Archives and Records Administration, National Archives and Records
Administration, 1 July 2016, obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/
2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures.
Fisher, Louis. “Basic Principles of the War Power.” J. Nat'l Sec. L. & Pol'y 5 (2011): 319.
Fisher, Louis. “Deciding on War against Iraq: Institutional Failures.” Political Science
Quarterly, vol. 118, no. 3, 2003, pp. 389–410. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/
30035781. Accessed 23 Apr. 2020.
Fisher, Louis. “Military Action against Iraq.” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 28, no.
4, 1998, pp. 793–798. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27551933. Accessed 21 Apr.
2020.
Fisher, Louis. “Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1, 2012, pp. 176-189.
Fisher, Louis. “Unconstitutional Presidential Wars.” Project On Government Oversight,
POGO, 29 Aug. 2018, www.pogo.org/analysis/2018/08/unconstitutionalpresidential-wars/.
Fisher, Louis. “Unconstitutional Wars from Truman Forward.” Humanitas Journal, vol.
XXX, Nos. 1 and 2, 2017.
Ghattas, Kim. “House of Representatives Votes against US Libya Role.” BBC News,
BBC, 24 June 2011, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-13908202.

124

Golan-Vilella, Robert. “A Tale of Two AUMFs.” The National Interest, no. 133, 2014, pp.
59–66., www.jstor.org/stable/44151202. Accessed 23 Apr. 2020.
Hamedy, Saba. “All the Times Trump Has Insulted North Korea.” CNN, Cable News
Network, 9 Mar. 2018, www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/donald-trump-northkorea-insults-timeline/index.html.
Jackson, David, and Tom Vanden Brook. “Trump Threatens Iran – Again – If It Attacks
U.S. Interests in Iraq.” USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 1 Apr.
2020, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/04/01/donald-trump-threatensiran-again-if-attacks-u-s-iraq/5104981002/.
Jacobs, Ben. “Trump Threatens 'Military Option' in Venezuela as Crisis Escalates.” The
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 12 Aug. 2017, www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/aug/11/donald-trump-venezuela-crisis-military-intervention.
Kim, Seung Min. “House Blocks Funds for Libyan Rebels.” Politico, Politico, 7
July 2011, www.politico.com/story/2011/07/house-blocks-funds-for-libyanrebels-058513.
Klarevas, Louis J. “Trends: The United States Peace Operation in Somalia.” The Public
Opinion Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 4, 2000, pp. 523–540. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/
stable/3078741. Accessed 21 Apr. 2020.
Kosar, Kevin. “Reclaiming Congress' War Powers.” LegBranch, LegBranch, 4 Aug.
2019, www.legbranch.org/reclaiming-congress-war-powers/.

125

Kurtzleben, Danielle. “CHART: How The U.S. Troop Levels In Afghanistan Have
Changed Under Obama.” NPR, NPR, 6 July 2016, www.npr.org/
2016/07/06/484979294/chart-how-the-u-s-troop-levels-in-afghanistan-havechanged-under-obama.
Landler, Mark, et al. “Trump to Withdraw U.S. Forces From Syria, Declaring 'We Have
Won Against ISIS'.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 19 Dec. 2018,
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/politics/trump-syria-turkey-troopwithdrawal.html.
“Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations.” 112th
Congress. (June 28, 2011) (statement of Louis Fisher, The Constitution Project),
available at http://loufisher.org/docs/wplibya/libyasenfr.pdf
McKelvey, Tara. “Trump Revokes Obama Rule on Reporting Drone Strike Deaths.” BBC
News, BBC, 7 Mar. 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47480207.
“Medellin v. Texas (2008).” Oyez, Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/2007/06-984.
Nelson, Dana D. “Presidential War Powers and Politics as War.” Bad for Democracy:
How the Presidency Undermines the Power of the People, NED - New edition
ed., University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis; London, 2008, pp. 109–144,
www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttt9zk.6. Accessed 14 Apr. 2020.
“OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM.” Outsourcing Security: Private Military
Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Bruce E. Stanley, University of
Nebraska Press, 2015, pp. 102–126. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/
j.ctt1d9nhv7.11. Accessed 24 Apr. 2020.
126

Ramsey, Michael D. “Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency.”
American Journal of International Law, vol. 110, no. 4, Aug. 2016, pp. 701–717.,
doi:10.1017/s0002930000763184.
Rotter, Andrew Jon. Light at the End of the Tunnel: a Vietnam War Anthology. Rowman
& Littlefield, 2010, p. 77.
Rubner, Michael. “The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and the
Invasion of Grenada.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 100, no. 4, 1985, pp. 627–
647. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2151544. Accessed 19 Apr. 2020.
Schonberg, Karl K. “Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering War Powers
after September 11.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 119, no. 1, 2004, pp. 115–
142., doi:10.2307/20202307. Accessed 14 2020.
Seligman, Lara. “No 'End Date' for U.S. Troops in Syria.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019,
foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/no-end-date-for-u-s-troops-in-syria/.
Sifton, John. “A Brief History of Drones.” The Nation, The Nation, 7 February 2012,
www.thenation.com/article/archive/brief-history-drones/.
Snow, Shawn, and Leo Shane III. “Trump Says Tweet Serves as 'Notification' to Congress
That US May 'Quickly & Fully Strike Back' against Iran.” Military Times,
Military Times, 7 Jan. 2020, www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/05/
trump-says-tweet-serves-as-notification-to-congress-that-us-may-quickly-fullystrike-back-against-iran/.
Spector, Ronald H. “Vietnam War (1954–75).” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia
Britannica, Inc., 14 Feb. 2020, www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War.
127

Tankel, Stephen, et al. “Donald Trump's Shadow War.” POLITICO Magazine, Politico, 9
May 2018, www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/05/09/donald-trumpsshadow-war-218327.
“The Iraq War Timeline (2003-2011).” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign
Relations, www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war.
“The Truman Doctrine, 1947.” U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian, U.S.
Department of State, history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine.
Thrall, Trevor. “Libya and the 5 Stages of U.S. Intervention.” Cato Institute, Cato
Institute, 19 Apr. 2016, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/libya-5-stages-usintervention.
Truman, Harry S. Memoirs by Harry S. Truman. Vol. 2, Doubleday & Co., 1956, pp.
331-333.
“War Powers.” Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the
U.S. National Security System, by D. Robert Worley, University of
Nebraska Press, 2015, pp. 58–86. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d98b41.10.
Accessed 22 Apr. 2020.
“War Powers Resolution.” Avalon Project - War Powers Resolution, Yale Law School:
Lillian Goldman Law Library, avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp.
Weed, Matthew C. “2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its
Continued Application,” Congressional Research Service, the Library of
Congress, April 14, 2015; Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/
67531/metadc505530/: accessed April 23, 2020)
128

Weed, Matthew C. “Presidential References to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force in Publicly Available Executive Actions and Reports to Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, May 11, 2016;
Washington D.C.. (https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc855911/:
accessed April 23, 2020)
“Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952).” C-SPAN Landmark Cases, National
Cable Satellite Corporation, 2020, landmarkcases.c-span.org/Case/7/
Youngstown-Sheet--Tube-Co-v-Sawyer.
“Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).” Justia Law U.S.
Supreme Court, Justia, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/343/579/.
“Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer - Significance.” Law Library - American Law
and Legal Information, Web Solutions LLC., 2020, law.jrank.org/pages/25147/
Youngstown-Sheet-Tube-Co-v-Sawyer-Significance.html.
Zelizer, Julian E. “How Congress Got Us Out of Vietnam.” The American Prospect, The
American Prospect, Inc., 19 Feb. 2007, prospect.org/features/congress-got-usvietnam/.
Zenko, Micah, and Jennifer Wilson. “How Many Bombs Did the United States Drop in
2016?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 Jan. 2017,
www.cfr.org/blog/how-many-bombs-did-united-states-drop-2016.
Zenko, Micah. “Obama's Final Drone Strike Data.” Council on Foreign Relations,
Council on Foreign Relations, 17 Jan. 2017, www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-finaldrone-strike-data.
129

Zenko, Micah. “Reflecting on Obama's Presidency: Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes
Will Be a Lasting Legacy.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 12 Jan.
2016, www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/01/12/reflecting-on-obamaspresidency/obamas-embrace-of-drone-strikes-will-be-a-lasting-legacy.

130

Conclusion Works Cited
Goodman, Ryan, and Steve Vladeck. “Why the 2002 AUMF Does Not Apply to Iran.”
Just Security, Just Security, 2 Apr. 2020, www.justsecurity.org/67993/whythe-2002-aumf-does-not-apply-to-iran/.
Kosar, Kevin. “Reclaiming Congress' War Powers.” LegBranch, LegBranch, 4 Aug.
2019, www.legbranch.org/reclaiming-congress-war-powers/.
Setzler, Elliot. “White House Releases Report Justifying Soleimani Strike.” Lawfare,
Lawfare and Brookings Institute, 14 Feb. 2020, www.lawfareblog.com/whitehouse-releases-report-justifying-soleimani-strike.

131

